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This thesis is titled Structural Adjustment and Brazilian 
Economic Development.. This study addresses the issue of 
structural adjustment in Brazil from a historical point of view, 
looking specifically at the fundamental impact of its policies on 
Brazil's dependency in the deveJopment process.
The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) is a specific policy- 
lending program initiated by the World Bank and the international 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in early 1980s, which is designed to stabilize 
distressed economy and to readjust the world economy into a neo­
classical economic structure.
Originally, Brazil was a typical classical dependent economy. 
Since the 1950s Brazil initiated its industrialization process 
under the import substitution strategy which was aimed at 
establishing a self-sustaining industrial system on the basis of 
"state control", and successfully transformed from a colonial 
agriculture-dominated economy into an industrial economy.
In the 1960s, under the constraints of capital accumulation rooted 
in a colonial economic structure, Brazil introduced neo-classical 
economic policies, combining them with an ISI strategy under a
(iii)
stabilization program, creating the economir miracle by taking 
advantages of favourable international conditions. However, over • 
reliance on foreign capital and the world market led Brazil 
economy towards a dependent form of development .
In the 1970s, the debt crisis caused by unfavourable Internal ional 
conditions after a series of oil shocks forced Brasi1 t(' box tow 
from the IMF and to adopt its SAP, which introduced a package of 
free market policies, distorting the leading role of the state in 
Brazil's development process, and creating a dependent peripheral 
economy..
This thesis concludes that the SAP is not. an appropriate utr at eg y 
for Brazil's development, and is a program designed (or the 
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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS STATEMENT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The structural adjustment program (SAP) refers to the 
specific policy-lending program initiated by the World Bank 
and IMF in early 1980s which were designed to stabilize 
distressed economies and to readjust the world economy into a 
neoclassical economic structure (Kolko, 1988). Although with 
different targets, the basic thinking and policies of SAPs 
were already included in the stabilization program of IMF 
instituted in the 1960s. In this sense, SAP could be 
considered a program theoretically developed in and as of the 
1960s. (Guitian, 1980)
Under this program, each country which borrows from the IMF 
must sign with the IMF a standby agreement, which includes a 
set of economic stabilization measures prescribed by the IMF, 
and implement such policies under the auspices of the IMF in 
order to reach certain quantitative targets of various 
macroeconomic variables specified in the agreement (Aufricht, 
1964) .
After the first SAP, a $200 million loan to turkey that came 
into effect in April 1980, more than 28.5 of billion 
adjustment lending flew to 64 countries through 187 separate
lending operations (Reed, 1992:1-2). Since then, a broad 
debate continues regarding the theory and impact of 
structural adjustment in stabilizing distressed economies 
and in creating favourable conditions for long-term economic 
growth as well as human development.
Industrialization in Brazil is also a controversial topic in 
the field of development studies. It involves a tortuous 
process undergone for almost half a century since the 1950s. 
In this period, the Brazilian economy experienced several 
dramatic rises and sharp falls. It is famous not only for its 
high-rate of economic growth from 1966 to 1970, but also an 
astonishing high rate of inflation, an equally significant 
disparity in income distribution, and a serious debt crisis.
In the 1950s, Brazil was successfully transformed from a 
colonial agriculture-dominated economy into an industry- 
dominated economy on the base of a strategy of ISI (import 
substitution industrialization). To achieve a continuing and 
sustained development, Brazil several times adjusted its 
development strategy after initiating industrialization. The 
most important two were the 1960s stabilization program and 
the SAP, implemented in the 1970s and 1980s. Both programs 
were strongly influenced by the neo-classical economic 
theory advocated by the IMF and the World Ban){, especially 
the latter, which was not only indirectly influenced by the
IMF in theoretical aspects, but was also directly implemented 
through the lending policies of both institutions.
Two adjustments in strategy led to totally different results. 
The first one created Brazil's "Economic Miracle", while the 
second did little to fundamentally improve the Brazilian 
economy. Today the Brazilian economy still fluctuates at a 
low ebb. In the period from 1980 to 1991, Brazil experienced 
another sharp deterioration in its economy. The gross 
domestic product has fallen dramatically and the economy had 
several times been on the edge of hyper-inflation, generating 
a political crisis.
1.2. THE SIS STATEMENT
In my study, I will argue that the economic crisis in brazil 
was fundamentally caused by its dependent economic structure 
and unfavourable external conditions and that the degree of 
dependency was strengthened by the package of classical 
economic policies instituted through the SAP. Most of the 
literature concerning Brazil's structural adjustment analyzes 
its economic and social impact from a horizontal point of 
view, focusing on a certain aspect or aspects such as 
inflation, the debt crisis, the class structure, income 
distribution, and so on during the SAP period. In my study, I 
will examine the role of SAP in Brazilian development with a 
historical comparison in terms of forms and conditions of
structural change and the degree of dependency in different 
periods of development. I am convinced that the SAP in 
Brazil is not an isolated event, but a historical phase in 
the whole process of Brazilian industrialization. Putting SAP 
in a historical context will give us a much clearer insight 
regarding its nature and impact on Brazilian development.
Three points should be mentioned about my case study. The 
first one concerns the concept of "dependency". There is no 
unified definition concerning dependency in the large 
literature discussing it. It is actually a vague and 
sprawling concept (Packenham, 1976) . Different values, 
different views of the world, and different angles of 
observation have led to various, sometime totally opposite 
explanations of Brazil's development. In my thesis, I will 
use the idea that a dependent country is a country whose 
development is "conditioned by the development and expansion 
of another economy" (dos Santos, 1970:236). To evaluate the 
degree of dependency of Brazilian economy, I will consider 
two questions. Firstly, to what extent, Brazil could make a 
decision on its economic activities and development model? 
Secondly, to what extent, Brazil could pursue a strategic 
alternatives when internal and external conditions change. 
The second point is that all my analyses concerning Brazil 
are based on tv'o facts. One is that, unlike some other newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) such as the four tigers in 
Asia, Brazil is a big country in terms of territory and
population, and rich in natural sources. Theoretically 
speaking, this fact provides Brazil a more solid condition 
for independent economic development than those countries 
with smaller territory and scare natural resources. However, 
historically speaking, Brazil has been an open economy which 
is deeply inserted into and strongly influenced by the world 
economy. In this respect, Brazil differs from closed and 
self-sustained semi-feudal economy such as China, although 
both countries are immense in territory and population, and 
rich in various natural resources. The combination of these 
two basic facts to an extent conditioned Brazil's economy and 
its development process, and should not be ignored when 
considering the Brazilian case.
Another point I should mention is that Structural Adjustment 
involves a complicated process with various dimensions and 
conditions in different countries. In this thesis, I will 
only focus on a dependency analysis of Brazilian economy. The 
essentially negative perspective on the SAP in Brazil should 
not be applied automatically to other countries, or to the 
evaluation of SAPs as a whole. Actually, it is not easy to 
evaluate SAPs as a whole with simple words such as "good" or 
"bad". As one of a number of development strategies, it has 
its advantages and disadvantages. Applying a certain strategy 
entails a complicated social choice which depends on the 
concrete conditions involved. Evaluation of the SAP which is 
carried out in so many countries also needs further research.
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Therefore the conclusion of this thesis applies only to the 
impact of SAP under conditions of economic dependency found 
in Brazil. Some possible extensions and implications of this 
thesis will be presented in the concluding chapter.
The structure of this paper is as follows. An overall review 
of the adjustment program in terms of theoretical background, 
objectives and main policies will be given in Chapter two. 
The next three Chapters, traces out three phases of 
industrialization in Brazil: ISI in the 1950s, stabilization 
in the 1960s and the structural adjustment program in the 
1970s and the 1980s. The thinking behind these programs, the 
associated policy measures, and their impact on the 
dependency of Brazil will be discussed. In these three 
chapters, i argue that Brazil has experienced a 
transformation from a relatively independent form of 
industrial development to one that is heavily dependent, and 
that the SAP is a catalyst of this transformation. In Chapter 
three I argue that ISI established a solid basis for self­
sustained development through state intervention. It is a 
necessary phase for a developing country under the 
constraints of capital accumulation. In Chapter four, I claim 
that the introduction of neo-classical theory under a 
stabilization program led Brazil's economy towards a form of 
dependent development, despite the economic miracle of the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s based on favourable external 
conditions, in chapter five, I argue that the SAP failed to
cure the debt crisis caused by deteriorating external 
conditions. By replacing ISI with a set of orthodox policies, 
it trapped Brazil's economy into a perpetual dependent 
position in which the economy is conditioned by the interests 
of external métropoles. In the last chapter, I conclude 
from this historical analysis that the SAP is designed for 
the benefit of interests in the core countries. Therefore it 
is not an appropriate or desirable strategy for Brazil's 
development.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND, THEORY AND PERFORMANCE OF SAPS
2.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
AS mentioned above, the SAP theoretically originated in the 
1960s. At that time, the post war system of international 
relations experienced a transformation from polarisation 
between the rich and poor into a highly integrated and 
interdependent global economic and political system.
Since World War Two (W.W.II), the world economy has developed 
and undergone three phases; (i) the domestic economy; (ii) 
the international economy; and (iii) the global economy 
(Adler, Nanacy, 1991) . In the first phase, the productive 
system was organized within a country; economic and political 
decisions of one country were made from a domestic or an 
ethnocentric perspective. In the second phase, economies were 
still state-oriented, but competition pushed domestic 
companies to the international market. Links between 
countries became closer and each country had to shift its 
policies to fit the needs of the international market. In the 
third phase, major economic operations breached and crossed 
borders, and was increasingly based on a global perspective.
The strongest expressions of the third phase are the growth 
and spread of transnational companies, many of whom with 
total sales that exceeded the GDP of all but the largest 
nation-states, and the growing integration of the 
international financial system.
After the Second World War, the dominant pattern in the world 
economy was the international economy, which was state- 
oriented with a polarized structure. Within this structure, 
nation-states were organized in three major blocs : (i) the
market-led industrial countries; (ii) the central planned 
socialist countries ; and (iii)the largely non-allied 
developing countries of the 'third world'..
In the industrial world, state intervention and the welfare 
state -- with reference to ideas formulated by Keynes -- 
prevailed. The monopolisation of capital and the strength of 
the working class and labour unions led to what has become 
known as "the historical compromise" between labour and 
capital at the national level. This system was based on the 
existence of a national system of production.
The socialist bloc, led by the former Soviet Union, with 
reference to or on the basis of Marxist doctrine, built a 
state central planning economic model for industrializing 
their economies. Since almost all socialist countries were 
established under backward economic conditions, they set
10
industrialization and "catching up" with the industrialized 
countries as the basic targets of their development process.
The non-socialist developing countries, which had been 
liberated from colonial rule in the post-second world war 
period, pursued industrialization and modernization on the 
basis of various development strategies. Among them the most 
popular was "Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)". 
This strategy was also supported by a national system of 
production, and the protection and development of domestic 
industries through state policies and intervention.
To sum up, in the post war world order, the national economy 
was the base of economic and political relations. States 
played the crucial role in the development process. The rich 
countries, a second world of countries and the bloc of 
socialist and developing countries confronted each other and 
formed relations on the basis of a national system.
As of the early 1970s, this picture has gradually given way 
to a more integrated process of production, which has a 
"global" rather than a "national" character. A technological 
revolution played a key role in this transformation. In this 
new phase, "capital is overcoming the constraints of national 
economic organization, subordinating it to global commodity 
markets that cross national boundaries" (McMichael and Myhre, 
1990:58). After this world productive system emerged, the
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capacity of the national system was gradually eroded. This 
process is also leading to a reorganization of the entire 
productive system, in which "domestic social and political 
relations are increasingly shaped by global capital 
circuits"(McMichael and Myhre,1990:59), and "the state must 
adjust their domestic policies to the exigencies of the world 
marketplace" (Hooey, 1992:87).
This transformation has taking place under conditions of a 
"global economic crisis" that can be traced back to the onset 
of declines in profitability and the rate of production of 
goods and services in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, two 
oil crises (in 1974 and 1979) shocked both the industrial and 
developing economies. After 25 years of almost uninterrupted 
growth -- the vaunted "Golden Age of capitalism" -- the 
capitalist world began to experience a painful series of 
cycles of stagflation, recession, and economic crisis. 
Meanwhile, after achieving in some cases what appeared to be 
a miraculous rate of development, characterised by 
unprecedented high growth rates and a process of rapid 
export-led industrialization, some developing countries 
experienced a serious debt crisis (Brazil being one of these 
Newly Industrialising Countries). The socialist bloc, after 
the collapse of the economy and the Communist Party control 
in the Soviet Union and Central Europe, has given up the 
central planning system because of its apparent inefficiency 
at the level of economic growth. And market-oriented reforms
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have spread to almost all socialist countries in the same way 
that earlier state-induced structural reform spread to and 
were introduced in all the OECD countries in the capitalist 
bloc.
Facing a global crisis, the whole world took the road of 
restructuring the world economy and structurally adjusting 
their relationship to it. What are causes of this global 
crisis? What were the major responses to it? What should the 
new world economic order be? Representing one school of 
thought, a model of national economic policies that has 
currently achieved hegemony, the World Bank and the IMF 
approached the global crisis with classical economic theory. 
Putting this theory into practice, the IMF and the World Bank 
initiated (in the 1960s) a stabilization program, and 
followed with the structural adjustment program (in the 
1980s) in order to overcome the crisis and reestablish the 
liberal world order set up at Bretton Woods in 1944 ( Mosley, 
Harrigan and Toye, 1991).
2.2. THB THEORY OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUETMINT PROGRAM
As mentioned above, the SAP is essentially premised on neo­
classical economic theory. The neoclassical school of 
economics was created by a group of economists that included 
William S. devons in England, Carl Menger in Austria, and 
Leon Walras in France; and it was developed by Alfred
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Marshall in Cambridge, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk in Vienna, 
Vilfredo Parito in Lausanne and John Bates Clark and Irving 
Fisher in the United states (Levitt, 1992).
The marginal equilibrium analysis of prices is the starting 
point of the neoclassical theoretical framework. Applying the 
price theory to explain a closed economy and an open economy, 
two key principles -- the "free market" and "free trade" -- 
were formulated. They are the policy foundation of the SAP.
Neo-classical economists hold that the market price of a 
commodity is determined by the demand and supply of it. The 
market price decreases when supply in a market exceeds 
demand, and increases when demand exceeds supply. The price 
at the level where demand equals supply is called the 
equilibrium price, and the output is called equilibrium 
output. In a perfectly competitive market, buyers and sellers 
of a goods are so numerous that no single buyer or seller can 
have an influence on the market price. Furthermore, this 
price acts as a signal that provides all the information 
necessary to distribute resources and output throughout the 
economy. Following the signal of the price, producers and 
consumers adjust their desires of buying and selling 
individually, consequently changing the general demand and 
supply of an economy. Due to the incentives of utility 
maximization for the consumers and profit maximization for 
the producers, free competition will finally lead to an
14
equilibrium level between demand and supply, at which 
resources will be located at an optimal level (Campus, 
1987:320-322).
Applying price theory to a closed economy, neoclassicists 
believe that the power of competition in free market is the 
most efficient regulating force of economic activity to 
establish equilibrium between production and consumption. 
They hold that the market provides a unique mechanism through 
which individuals, by pursuing their own interest, create 
wealth which benefits society in general as well as 
themselves in particular. In other words, with reference to 
Adam Smith's original formulation, the mystical functions of 
the "invisible hand" of the market freed from constraint -- 
the unrestrained pursuit of individual economic gain -- 
ensures the greatest social benefit (Hooey,1992),
From this analysis, the obvious policy solution for domestic 
economic operations is to get the government out of the 
market. The exponents of this theory argue that government 
intrusion, whether in the form of purchases of goods and 
services, transfer payments, regulations, taxes, or monetary 
actions, distorts the relative costs and prices of goods, and 
misleads resources allocation. Good public economic policy 
should reduce the government's presence in the private 
marketplace and create a perfectly competitive environment 
(Levitt, 1992:78-80).
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Applying the price theory to an open economy, neoclassicists 
advocate free trade policy established on the theory of 
comparative advantage. They believe that the rule governing 
the profitability of buying at home or abroad is not the 
absolute but the relative (or comparative) advantage of 
countries in the production of different goods. If all 
countries specialized in the production of those goods in 
which they have comparative advantages, obtaining other goods 
they need through foreign trade, world output would be higher 
than that could have been obtained by a universal policy of 
national self-sufficiency, since under free competition and 
free trade, the production of a product will be switched to 
where the cost is lower in order to obtain higher profit. 
Resources would be allocated at an optimum level; and, as a 
result, every country would produce at a lower cost and get 
more at the same level of income. In this division of world 
labour, citizens of each country would be better off and 
nobody would lose. Therefore international trade under free 
competition is necessary for the benefit of the world.
To explain the worldwide crisis in capitalist production, 
neoclassical economists argue that the state intervention in 
economy and protectionism in world trade distorted the 
working of the price mechanism in guiding resource 
allocation, destroying the function of the market in
16
adjusting investment and consumption, resulting in a global 
crisis.
Specifically, neoclassical economists argue that the debt 
crisis in developing countries was caused by the weakness of 
their state-controlled economic structure and policies caused 
by irrational government interventions. They also hold that
an over ambitious industrialization in developing countries
inevitably resulted in expansionary financial policies, 
associated with large budgetary expectations and BOP
imbalances. Similarly, high inflation rates resulted from an 
over-aggressive investment policy. Hence an improvement of 
the economy should depend largely on domestic structural 
adjustment which would lead to a market economy free of 
government interference (Dale, 1983).
With strong lending powers, the World Bank and IMF, believe 
that limited financing would be an efficient means of
promoting free trade and exchange stability since such credit 
would keep nations from imposing restrictions on trade, and 
ensure the eventual correction of the balance of payments 
disequilibrium. With this analysis and prognosis, the IMF 
initiated the structural adjustment program in the late 1970s 
(Crockett, 1991 and Kolko, 1988). Since then the IMF has 
played a leading role in restructuring the world economy.
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2.3. PERFORMANCE OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
SAP has both short-term and long-term objectives. In the 
short term, SAP is designed to aid severely debt-distressed 
economies and improve their balance of payments. In the long 
term, SAP seeks to adjust the Third World countries into a 
more favourable position in the international division of 
labour by promoting an export-oriented economy.
The main policy measures of SAP used to realize its 
objectives reflect the dominance of the neo-classical 
economic theory behind it (Williamson, 1983, Guitian, 1980 
and Hooey, 1992). They include:
* Currency devaluation. It is designed to restore a 
balance between import and export in a country. According 
to classical economists, currency devaluation encourages 
ex. orts by lowering the price of export goods, and 
restricts imports by increasing the price of import goods. 
The two movements in opposite direction, in turn, will 
improve the balance of payment.
• Ruitoration of the market aaehaniam including trade
liberalization, phasing out tariffs and subsidiaries. This 
condition is based on the orthodox principle of "government 
get out". The goal is to diminish the state's restriction 
of international trade and interference in domestic 
economy.
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• Damand management measures including freezing or 
reducing wages, cutting state expenditures, including 
social welfare and the education budget. These measures are 
aimed at controlling an over-ambitious economic expansion, 
and curbing inflation. According to The Bank, fiscal policy 
is the quickest but not the least painful form of 
adjustment because of its effect in domestic demand. But 
growing fiscal deficits have reducing implications for 
three key macroeconomic targets: debt, inflation and the 
growth rate of the economy (World Bank, 1991:22). The 
interesting thing here is that this policy measure actually 
was borrowed from Keynes' economic theory, which emphasizes 
the role of the state in national economic management.
« Privatization of state owned •nfrnrla^a. Classical 
economists believe that public ownership and state 
interference is the origin of inefficiency. While all 
chosen policy instruments are directed at decreasing the 
influence of the government in the economy, privatization 
aims at fundamentally changing the social structure, from a 
state-led economy into a market-oriented system in which 
private enterprises competitively operate and adjust their 
activities according to price signals in a free market.
19
These policy measures clearly show that the IMF intends to 
guide the world economy towards to a neo-liberal model of 
development.
The key instrument of the IMF for carrying out SAP is 
"conditionality" for lending. If a country is forced by its 
debt to ask for assistance, the IMF always gives the country 
a "letter of intent" in which all preconditions for borrowing 
are included. Although specific terms and conditions 
necessarily vary from country to country, key conditions for 
structural adjustment lending adhere to the above-mentioned 
policies (Kolko, 1988) .
Lending conditionalities rarely deviate from a set formula, 
regardless of the situation in different countries. A country 
can get a loan only if it abides with these conditions. 
Hence the IMF is able to strongly influence the recipient 
country's policies and economic strategy in three ways :
(1) by imposing conditionality, on the basis, the IMF 
can help formulate policy changes in recipient countries;
(2) by legally providing advice and consolidating 
reforms based on a lending contract after an adjustment 
program is initiated;
(3) the release of borrowed funds contingent on 
fulfillment of pre-agreed conditions. For example, the 
structural adjustment loan may be conditioned upon completion
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of 20% currency devaluation. If this condition is not met 
within an agreed-upon time, the borrowing government has to 
meet the IMP to resolve the difficulties prior to release of 
subsequent funds (Bruon, 1990).
The "conditionality" clause became a crucial negotiable 
instrument for the IMF to force each country, especially 
developing countries, to "adjust" its economic structure to 
the design of the IMF. After the first program, more and more 
complex and stringent conditionalities were attached to IMF 
loans. Statistics show that the first structural adjustment 
loan (SAL) in 1980 had 9 conditions; The second SAL (in 1982) 
had 42 conditions. The average number of conditions increased 
from 27 in 1985 to 56 in 1989 (World Bank, 1992:33-48). In 
fact, through the 'conditionality" clause for lending, the 
IMF "took the place of the gold standards", deciding "which 
payment deficits were 'temporary' or 'fundamental', and which 
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'. With its power of lending, 
it disciplined the players in the world economy" (Moffit, 
1989).
2.4. Summary
SAP is a policy lending program initiated by the world Bank 
and the IMF to overcome the global crisis caused by the 
emergence of a world productive system. "Free Market" and 
"free trade" are the policy foundation of SAP.
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The World Bank and che IMF use neo-classical economics to 
explain the global crisis. They argue that the state 
intervention in economic activities and protectionism in the 
world trade destroy the free market system and has cause the 
global crisis. They insist that there is no conflict of 
interest between developed and developing countries under the 
free market and free trade system. All countries will benefit 
because free competition brings about the lowest costs for 
products everywhere. They conclude that the only way to 
overcome the crisis is to restructure the world economy into 
a neo-liberal world order on the basis of "getting prices 
right".
With their strong lending power, the World Bank and the IMF 
use Conditionality clause as a tool to force borrowing 
countries to carry out a package of neo-classical policies 
under SAP and to shape their development in a Neo-liberal 
model.
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CHAPTER I I I
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION AMDBRAZIL'S 
ECONOMIC DBVBLOPMBNT IM THE 19508
3.1. A PROFITABLE AND VULNERABLE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
BEFORE W.W.II.
Before World War Two, Brazil economy was a typical colonial 
agriculture-dominated economy. Two-thirds of its agricultural 
production was exported. This colonial economy had two basic 
characteristics. One was its reliance on single primary 
product export. The other was its reliance on import of 
manufacturing goods from industrial countries.
In the late nineteenth century, Brazil's exports were 
concentrated on several few products, especially coffee. 
Brazil was the major supplier of the world coffee market. 
Coffee exports accounted for more than half of total exports
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from 1889 to 1893 (Evans, 1979:58). Due to the significant 
proportion of coffee in total exports, the increase and 
decrease of demand for coffee in the world market directly 
influenced Brazil's balance of payments, and consequently 
determined the growth rate of the GDP. Brazil's economy was 
vividly described by Evans as follows:
"Bags of coffee, loaded onto ships docked in 
the port of Santos, were Brazil's link to the 
international economy of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries." (Evans, 1979:55)
As the consequence of a single primary product economy, 
Brazil was very reliant on imports from industrial countries 
for its manufacturing goods. During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, Brazil imported most of its 
manufactured goods from Britain. Through its exports and 
imports, the Brazilian economy was closely linked to and 
dependent on the international market.
As much of the literature points out, Brazil's coffee economy 
provided a model of a centre-periphery world economic system 
provided by dependency theorists in their analysis. As the 
major coffee producer and exporter to Britain, Brazil 
functioned as a primary agriculture product provider and 
industrial products consumer in the international division of 
labour.
Because the international coffee market continued to expand 
during the late nineteenth century, the high demand for
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coffee dramatically increased coffee production in Brazil. 
The boom of the coffee economy brought both Britain and local 
coffee planters large profits. And a part of these profits 
was used to develop manufacturing in Brazil.
while the surplus of coffee economy provided the original 
capital accumulation for manufacturing, the basic fact of 
broad size in terms of territory and population also provided 
a possibility for development of domestic manufacturing in a 
colonial economic structure. In a big country such as Brazil, 
it was impossible for Portugal, the suzerain country, to 
control the whole domestic market, which left room for 
domestic industries to be born and grow up. However, domestic 
manufacturing developed under the pressure of colonial rule 
and depended on foreign capital and technology, and was not 
allowed to be strong enough to fundamentally change the 
colonial structure as a whole. In a position of weakness, 
when pressures increased, the Brazilian state and local 
capitalists formed an alliance with foreign capital for the 
exploitation of domestic resources.
Although profitable, the Brazilian economy was vulnerable 
because of its reliance on the export of a single primary 
product. During the Great Depression, the world market for 
primary products, especially food and agricultural raw 
materials, shrank. Between 1929 to 1931, for the New York 
price of top grade Brazilian coffee dropped by 60% (Evans,
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1979;58);the market for coffee was no longer expanding. 
Meanwhile new competitors stepped into the world coffee 
market and Brazil steadily lost its share of the world 
market. At the same time, with the supply restriction by 
industrial countries during the second world war, imports of 
manufacturing goods were also difficult for Brazil. Brazil’s 
colonial economy was shaken by the recession of the world 
market, it was obvious that if Brazil were to continue to 
develop under these conditions of classical dependence, its 
economy would continue to fluctuate with the periodical 
crises in the world market.
3.2 The Theory of 181 in the 1950s
Under the threat of collapse of the economy due to the 
shrinking international coffee market, Brazil began to 
consider a new way of development. ISI was put forward and 
carried out in the 1950s in order to change its vulnerable 
economic structure and to bring about industrialization.
The basic thinking of ISI was formulated by Paul Prebisch, 
one of the founders of development economics. The starting 
point of his theory is relations of a colonial economy with 
the external world (Pastor, 1984:24-27). According to this 
theory, there were basically two gr ups of countries in the 
world economy. One was classified as dependent -- development 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another
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economy (dos Santos, 1970:236). The other group included 
industrial or core countries which played the central role in 
the world economy.
Relations between the two groups were not equal because of 
their different positions in the international economy. 
Usually, dependent countries like Brazil specialized in the 
production of single or a few primary agricultural goods. 
They were involved in the international market as a provider 
of a few primary products. The income from these few 
products constituted them major resources and was absolutely 
critical to the process of their initial capital accumulation 
which was at the base of the industrialization process. 
However, their exports of primary products depended on the 
demand for their products in the international market. In 
other words, "the development of the dependent country 
requires the continued acceptance of its products in the 
centre"(Evans, 1979:58). In this sense, the development of 
dependent countries was conditioned by the core countries. As 
the economy in the centre fluctuated, so did those of the 
dependent countries. Under the condition of this relation, 
the latter had no alternative but to escape from the former's 
influence.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the core countries 
usually had strong and diversified industries. They imported 
raw materials and agricultural products from different
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dependent countries. Even one kind of product can usually be 
obtained from several different sources. Each product 
produced by one dependent country represented only a tiny 
fraction of total imports by core countries. Therefore, an 
economic crisis in the periphery would not severely threaten 
economies in the centre.
Such a division of labour in the international economic 
system placed the core countries in an absolutely superior 
and controlling position, and the dependent countries in a 
controlled and subordinate one. Dependence, in this context 
is defined simply as a situation in which the rate and 
direction of accumulation are externally conditioned by the 
core countries (Evans, 1979:27-28).
In the central-periphery international order, this unequal 
relation was mainly realized and strengthened through unequal 
trade exchanges. Core countries controlled prices though 
their monopoly of the industrial products in the world 
market, raising prices when they exported their industrial 
products to periphery countries and cut off prices when they 
imported raw and process materials from developing countries. 
Through this unequal exchange, profits flew into the 
countries on the periphery and entrapped dependent countries 
into an abyss of suffering. Dependency theory attributed the 
poverty and backwardness in developing countries to this 
unequal relation between periphery countries and core
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countries, and asserted that the only way for dependent 
countries to get rid of their backward economy was to break 
this unequal link between the two groups by establishing a 
self-sustaining system based on diversified industries. As a 
practical way to break out of this unequal relation, it 
encouraged dependent countries to protect their own 
industries and to substitute (set up domestic production) for 
imports through governmental control of imports.
The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) used this 
theory to explain Brazil's economic situation, attributing 
Brazil's economic backwardness and crisis in the Great 
Depression to a colonial economic structure based on single 
primary goods export, and the lack of an industrial base 
(Syvrud, 1974:12). It suggested an import substitution 
industrialization strategy (ISI) to bring about a radical 
change in Brazil's economic structure. By this time 
Brazilian policy makers were convinced that high rates of 
economic growth could ultimately be obtained only by such a 
change.
3.3. PBRFORMANCB OP 181 IM THE 19508
The most important economic policy instruments used by the 
Brazilian Government in the 1950s to stimulate 
industrialization can be classified into three categories:
(i) import control; (ii) foreign exchange control; and (ill)
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state investment in key industries. In this part, I will 
first briefly discuss each of these measures, then examine 
the nature and outcomes of the ISI strategy as a whole.
imnart gQntcal
Import control was the most important instrument in the ISI 
strategy. It was aimed at restriction the import of goods and 
shielding the domestic market for domestic infant industries 
in areas previous dependent on imports, protecting them from 
stronger foreign competitors. It was expected that the 
domestic industry system would grow up under such a 
protection, and would finally be strong enough to replace the 
foreign imports. Import control was realized in Brazil mainly 
through direct quantitative import restrictions and indirect 
tax policies -- preclusive tariffs.
Quantitative import restriction was a straightforward measure 
not requiring any further explanation. The only thing that 
should be emphasized is that industries being restricted from 
import mainly involved consumer goods and manufacturing goods 
which could be and were planned to be produced in Brazil.
Preclusive tariffs were imposed with two goals. One was the 
same as quantitative import restriction -- protecting 
adequately the newly stimulated industries. The other was to 
attract foreign capital investment in such industries. The 
Tariff Law, SUMOC Institution 113, issued in 1956, obviously
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favoured foreign investors who invested in stimulated 
industries. A lower tariff rate was applied if they imported 
capital equipment in such industries. The later Tariff Law of 
1957 expanded and solidified the protection offered to the 
growing domestic industry. For industries that were not 
favoured, tariffs were usually as high as 60,80 and 150 
percent (Syvrud, 1974).
Both quantitative restriction and preclusive tariffs favoured 
products such as raw materials and equipment, which were 
considered essential for production and capital formation.
Foreign Exchange Rate Control
In the mid-nineteen fifties, the exchange system in Brazil 
was not only regarded as an instrument to cope with balance- 
of-payments difficulties as before, but more as a principal 
policy instrument to stimulate the great ISI drive in order 
to realize a radical change in the structure of the Brazilian 
economy. The exchange rate was purposely manipulated to 
protect favoured domestic industries.
The main measure of foreign exchange control executed in 
Brazil was the preferential exchange rate system. In the 
1950's Brazil's exchange system was changed into a multiple 
exchange rate system, in which, imported goods were 
classified into two categories. A "general category" included
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the imports of raw materials, capital goods and certain 
essential consumer goods considered to be of essential and 
high priority, while the other "specific category" included 
all goods not considered essential. An special low exchange 
rate called "cambio de costo" was maintained for the 
importation of goods in the first category. Interest and 
amortization payments for loans were also provided for these 
imports(Bear, 1965:55-60). However, the price of foreign
exchange for imported goods in the "special category"' would 
rise up to twice or three times as much as the rates of the 
general categories.
From the following table, it is clear that preferential 
exchange rate was granted mainly to equipment, petroleum and 
wheat products in the late half of the 1950s.




Year Equipment Petroleum wheat Newsprint Others
1955 46 27 20 6 1
1956 50 32 13 4 1
1957 54 28 11 5 2
1958 52 28 12 4 2
1959 57 24 14 3 2
1960 57 23 13 3 4
Source: Computed from data supplied by the research Division 
of SUMOC.
32
laytitmtat-g af Govarommnc ia ..K#y -fttgtQra
while the previous two policy instruments emphasized the 
protection of domestic favoured industries from competition 
of industrial countries, the third policy aimed to establish 
and strengthen domestic industries in a short period.
Governmental investments was overwhelmingly concentrated into 
several key sectors, such as electricity, transportation and 
“basic industries", in such fields as steel and petroleum, 
chemicals and nonferrous metal industries.
This investment distribution was a direct result of the 
ideology of import substitution. It was believed that a solid 
and diversified domestic productive capacity in several key 
industries was essential to modern economy and would reduce, 
if not end, Brazilian dependence on foreign trade and foreign 
lenders. With the establishment and expansion of domestic 
industries, Brazil wished to exclude foreign investors from 
control of certain sectors of the national economy (Leff, 
1968:45-47) ,
Through intensive investments, the public sector's share in 
total national aggregate fixed capital increased rapidly from 
15.8 percent in 1947 to 51.2 percent in 1958 (Gee table 3.2). 
In order to realize capital accumulation in public industrial 
sectors over a short period, in addition to expanding direct
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investment in public corporations, the government also 
offered indirect subsidies to industry through delayed 
payment of taxes at reduced real values. Meanwhile the tax 
imposed on agricultural goods was twice that on manufacturing 
goods.
Table 3.2 Public Sector's Share of Aggregate Fixed 
Capital Formation in Brazil, 1947-1960
Year Percentage Three-Year Moving Averag»













1960 58.8 —  —
Source: Calculated from data published in Review of Brazilian 
Economy. (March 1962).
The set of policy instruments pursued by Brazilian 
governments to promote rapid industrialization proved to be 
highly effective in expanding industrial investment and in 
stimulating rapid economic growth. During the period from 
1947 to 1961, the Brazil's gross domestic product grew at an 
average annual rate of 7.2 (Syvrud, 1974:16). which was the 
highest rate in the world. By 1962, Brazil had advanced 
toward its industrialization objective and became famous as a 
successful newly industrialized country.
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A more important achievement of Brazil in the 1950's was 
based on the transformation of its economic structure. With 
the ISI strategy, it realized three shifts:
(1) Exam .aa ....a.g£ ig.ul.UiLa 1 dominated economy ta an
industry-leading economy. Through ISI Brazil successfully 
established its modern industrial framework. The share of 
industries in GDP continued to increase. By 1959, it 
surpassed the share of agriculture by almost 10 percent (see 
Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Change In Sectoral Composition of GDP
Year Agriculture (%) Industry(%) Service*(%)
1939 25.8 19.4 54.8
1949 26.0 26.2 47.8
1959 20.2 30.1 49.7
* Service includes government, transport and communication, 
financial intermediaries and rent, as well as commerce.
Source; IBGE 1972:516
AS industry took over the predominant position previously 
held by agriculture, the industrial structure also 
significantly changed. With the stimulation of Import 
substitution policy, new industries such as transportation 
equipment, electrical equipment Fabrication, chemicals and 
machinery dramatically developed, and replaced traditional 
industries such as food and textiles as the central core of 
the industrial structure.
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(2) From a single primary product export economvLinbo a 
more diversified export economy. The proportion of coffee 
dropped from 73% of exports in 1920's to 53% of exports in 
the 1960‘s. Meantime Brazil began to export manufactures, 
although in the 1960s they comprised of a tiny proportion ( 
2%) of total exports (Evans, 1979:67), The import structure 
changed more quickly than the export structure. Capital 
goods, raw materials and intermediary products replaced non 
durable consumer goods as the bulk of imports. This 
diversified trend was also reflected in the increase of the 
number of suppliers of imported goods and export customers.
(3) From an open colonial economy into a more, closed 
self-reliance economy. As the growth of domestic industries, 
overall reliance on imports and exports diminished. The 
proportion of exports in the gross domestic products sharply 
decreased from 24.9 % in 1907 to 7.0% in 1960, and import 
from 18.7% to 8.5% over the same period. The rise of new 
industries also diminished the dependence on foreign 
manufactured goods. According to Evans, in electrical 
machinery, imports decreased from over five times of local 
production in 1949 to less than 25% in 1962; in chemicals, 
form almost nine times local production to about 30% (Evans, 
1979:72).
Following the development of industry, domestic purchasing 
power increased rapidly, which largely stimulated the demand
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for various consumer goods and significantly expanded the 
domestic market.
3.4. ANALYSIS OF THE ISI STRATEGY
The main policy instruments in Brazil's 
industrialization drive were based on a radical commitment to 
ISI. All policies were directed at diverting resources, 
including domestic and foreign resources into industrial 
capital formation. All protective measures and subsidies 
changed relative prices and earnings in favour of industry. 
In other words, capital accumulation and rapid industrial 
growth in Brazil was realized through moving profits of other 
non-industrial sectors into industrial sectors (Syvrud, 
1974:24-26).
Another characteristic of Brazilian industrialization was 
"state control". The Brazilian government played an essential 
role in the ISI process. Of the three major policy 
instruments-- import control, foreign exchange control and 
government investments--all were under the control of the 
government. The government functioned in a wide range of 
production and investment activities. An ECLA study of 
Brazilian economic policy presents this picture:
Brazil's public sector owns ... the 
country's maritime...rail transport facilities and
its installations for the production of 
petroleum...controls most of the steel-making sector, 
and is rapidly becoming the principal producer of 
electric energy. It...markets a considerable proportion
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of the exportable production;it is also the principal 
iron ore producer and exporter.lt exercises
direct... control over the exchange market,,.. It 
constitutes., the major commercial banking enterprises 
since it accounts for about 35 percent of the general 
credit extended to the private sector 
through the Banco Do Brazil, and most of the 
agricultural credit.. through other specialized 
financial agencies it grants the whole of cooperative 
credit and long-term financing. It establishes wages, 
interest rates, rents, and is beginning to... operate a 
large scale storage and marketing system for 
agricultural commodities... It determines the 
composition of private investment and intervenes in the 
capital market" (ECLA, 1964:196-197).
Combining these two characteristics, it is easy to see that 
ISI in brazil in nature was a process in which high-speed 
accumulation in industry was realized through forced saving 
and redistribution of national resources under the direction 
of a non-economic agency--the state, rather than a natural 
accumulation based on the gradual increase of national 
capital. The growth of industry, to a large extent, was based 
on an increase of the public sector stimulated by 
protectionist policies.
The pattern of Brazil's development, the transformation of 
its economic structure, and its performance, showed this 
strategy to be effective, but it required and worked only 
under certain conditions. To explain this point more clearly, 
it is necessary to review the internal and external 
conditions faced by Brazil before ISI. The key internal 
condition in Brazil at that time was the backwardness of its 
economy. As discussed in first part of this chapter, Brazil 
had an agricultural economy with extremely weak industry
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before the 1940s, Although a few manufacturing industries 
emerged on the basis of reinvested their profit from coffee 
exports, they struggled to survive and grow between the 
cracks of foreign capital, were vulnerable and grew slowly. 
This backward economy was not able to provide enough capital 
for the initial capital accumulation required by a speedy 
industrialization, which created a serious dilemma for 
Brazil's development. On the one hand, Brazil needed rapid 
capital accumulation for industrialization in order to break 
the control of colonial rules, catch up and surpass 
industrial countries; On the other hand, it faced an extreme 
scarcity of capital. Thinking about the big size in territory 
and population, it was obvious that Brazil could not 
completely rely on foreign aid or debt to finish initial 
capital accumulation. How could Brazil resolve the 
contradiction between demand and supply of capital on the 
base of self-reliance? One option was market with natural 
capital accumulation, but it would involve a long and painful 
development process.
In considering the external conditions Before ISI, the 
impossibility for Brazil to industrialize in a normal way 
becomes more apparent. In development of Brazil, as a 
provider of primary products within the international labour 
division, was controlled by international capital. The most 
important element in the external conditions is that it faced 
the strong industrial world which had been developing for
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several decades. They had abundant capital, high-level 
technologies and were in a dominant position in the world 
market. More importantly, they were reluctant to lose their 
power and to change the existing economic order in which they 
enjoyed many advantages. Under such conditions, a normal 
process of industrialization in Brazil could not be 
successful since any efforts to industrialize in this way 
would be easily pressed down by this strong outside force. In 
other words, Brazil, under these specific internal and 
external conditions needed a force strong enough to protect 
its development and industrialization.
In brief, both internal and external conditions had forced 
Brazil to find a non-economic force to break the economic 
pressure. To some extent, this was a political target rather 
than an economic target. While in a weak economic position, 
Brazil could not rely on the market to reach its target -- 
speedy industrialization. In contrast, the state, being a 
strong non-market force, was able to generate a rapid process 
of capital accumulation through a non-market way--forced 
saving and the redistribution of limited national resources, 
which provided Brazil with the ability to collect a relative 
large mass of capital in some key sectors in a short period. 
Brazil's success in 1950's evidenced the effectiveness of 
this strategy. Three shifts in Brazil's economic structure 
helped Brazil to break its controlling-controlled links in 
the traditional international labour division, and furnished
40
basic conditions for its further self-reliant development. 
This achievement and the role of the ISI strategy in 
Brazilian industrialization process should not be ignored.
However, while the ISI strategy successfully changed the 
colonial structure of Brazil, through the establishment of 
the national industry and the expansion of the domestic 
market, it proved to be effective only under specific 
conditions in the short run. It had latent limits for long­
term development due to its “single-mindedness" and the 
prevalence of "non-economic" instruments. The main problems 
which have been discussed in the literature were inefficiency 
(Packenham, 197 6) and the ignoring of other goals in the 
development process, such as macro-economic balance, 
equitable income distribution and other social objectives, 
such as better housing and improvement of educational 
opportunities, etc. (Packenham, 1976).
It has been argued by many economists that these internal 
weaknesses of ISI led to significant disparities in regional, 
sectoral and social distributions of income, increased 
deficits and high inflation, all factors associated with 
Brazilian growth in 1950s. These problems finally blocked 
brazil's continued development and exhausted its potential, 
leading to a period of stagnation after 1973 with a lower 
growth rate, an astonishing high rate of inflation, and large 
deficits in the balance of payments (Syvrud,1974).
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But this is an argument that looks only at the surface of 
things. Although it is true that the ISI strategy had 
weaknesses, most of them were a legacy of the colonial 
economic structure. To some extent, these weaknesses are 
unavoidable in the transformation of a colonial economy into 
a modern industrialized economy. In this sense, ISI was not a 
perfect or the best strategy in theory, but the more 
practical and best choice under the given conditions.
Taking the example of ignorance of development in 
agricultural sector (Syvrud, 1974), considering the processes 
of initial capital accumulation in different economically 
backward countries, it is obvious that such a process and 
form of capital accumulation was common in colonial 
economies. It is not because non-economic accumulation is the 
best way, but because drawing profit from the agricultural 
sector to the industrial sectors is almost the only choice 
under the unfavourable internal and external conditions 
formed within the traditional colonial economic structure. 
There was almost no other capital resources to finance a 
self-reliant industrialization. Without the temporary 
sacrifice of agriculture, the basic industrial framework 
would have not have been established in a short period, and 
Brazil would have retained a colonial economic structure for 
a longer time. In this sense, this weakness ultimately came 
from the colonial economy itself.
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With respect to the large deficit, as mentioned before, 
historically the Brazilian economy had a close link with the 
international economy. Although the ISI strategy 
fundamentally changed classical dependency of Brazil on 
foreign capital, it is impossible to completely cut off such 
links in a short period of less than ten years. A self- 
reliant economy needed a strong industrial base and a broad 
domestic market which took time to build up. This 
transformation could only occur in a gradual historical 
process. From the same statistics recited above concerning 
the structure and composition of foreign trade, it can be 
seen that although mono-cultural exports was diminished, most 
exports still consisted of agricultural goods. In the import 
side, Brazil still needed large amounts of imports for its 
industrialization because of the weakness of domestic 
industry, although the composition of imports dramatically 
changed from consumer goods to capital goods. This imbalance 
between imports and exports also originated in the limits of 
the colonial economic structure itself, and was the main 
reason for the accumulation of large deficits.
A similar situation applied to the high inflation rate which 
was actually used as a tool of forced saving for 
industrialization. In brief, the weaknesses of the ISI 
strategy was fundamentally rooted in, and reflected the 
limits, the backwardness and dependence of the colonial
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economic structure. The influence of this residual colonial 
economy appeared in a form of limitations built into ISI.
3.5 Conclusion
ISI is an inward-oriented strategy of self-reliant 
development based on state intervention. Under this strategy 
Brazil successfully changed its colonial economic structure 
into an industry-leading economy through the establishment of 
national industry and the expansion of the domestic market 
under the state intervention. State intervention was proved a 
necessary and effective way to break the controlling - 
controlled links in the traditional labour division, and to 
finish the initiate capital accumulation needed for speedy 
industrialization in a developing country with limit capital 
resources.
Although the ISI strategy had latent limits for long-term 
development due to its "single-mindedness" and the prevalence 
of "non-economic" instruments, it provided Brazil a solid 
industrial basis for an independent development. In nature, 
the weaknesses of ISI were fundamentally rooted in and 




THE STABILIZATION STRATEGY IN THE 1960'8 
AND THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE
4.1. STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE 1960S
Stagnation after 1962 led to critical examination of the 
import substitution industrialization strategy in the 1950s. 
Two main schools of thought formed on the causes of 
stagnation. One school emphasised the weaknesses of 
traditional society, they attributed the stagnation to the 
limited market which resulted from the unchanged traditional 
society while ISI was processed (Furtado, 1968). The other 
school emphasised the improper policies involved in ISI. They 
believed that stagnation was the result of the distortions of
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the unbalanced growth process, caused by government
interference (Simonsen 1969).
As far as concrete policies are concerned, four major 
strategic options for stabilizing the Brazilian economy at 
that time were well summarized by Donald E. Syvrud as 
follows :
1. To continue the trend toward greater centralization 
of economic decision making in the public sector or to 
reverse this trend and provide greater opportunity for 
the price mechanism and private sector initiative;
2.To continue the unbalance growth of import
substitution industrialization or to shift to a more
balanced economic growth with several leading sectors;
3.To continue protectionist trade policies or to 
liberalize foreign trade policies toward an expanding role in 
world trade;
4.To continue the emphasis on rapid economic growth at
the expense of social objectives or to aim at a greater
be lance in social and economic objectives at the cost of 
dampening the growth rate" (Syvrud, 1974:37).
The economists who determined Brazil's policies after 1964 
were comprised of a team of professional experts who were 
strongly influenced by neo-classical economics. They 
attributed the decline of the economy to the unbalanced form 
of development, especially the ISI policies such as inflation 
and price controls, the overvalued exchange rate, a selective 
investment policy, rigid control in exports and imports, and 
so on. Given the severity of the imbalances and distortions 
in the economy, they believed that the stabilization measures
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recommended by the IMF and structural changes in Brazilian 
economy were essential conditions for a resumption of 
growth.
Starting from this basic thinking, the team of economists 
emphasized the need to stimulate investments in the private 
sector and to give greater scope to the free price mechanism; 
They turned away from import substitution industrialization 
towards investment in agriculture, housing and exports 
sectors. They decided to move gradually toward to a more 
liberal foreign trade policy; to put more emphasis on 
increasing productivity and efficiency in the economic 
system; and gave social objectives such as equitable income 
distribution on a sectoral basis more consideration. The 
economic strategy of the Gastello Branco government was first 
outlined in the Action Program for 1964-1966 (Higgins, 1964). 
The economic social policy objectives demonstrated in it 
included: a) accelerating the rhythm of economic
development, aiming at 6 percent growth rate by 1966 and 7 
percent in succeeding years; b) countering progressively the 
inflationary process during 1964 and 1965 so as to achieve a 
reasonable degree of price equilibrium in 1966, which, 
translated into specific numbers, meant a price target of 25% 
in 1965 and 10 percent in 1966. c) alleviating the sectoral 
and regional disparities and the tensions created by social 
disequilibrium so as to improve the standard of living; d) 
assuring, through investment policy, opportunities for
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productive employment; e) correcting the tendency for 
uncontrolled balance of payments deficit (Action Program, 
1 9 6 4 : 1 5 ) .
Although the option of Gastello Branco government obviously 
favoured neoclassical theory, it was not a simple application 
of this theory. Related government documents indicated that 
ISI still the foundation of the government's stabilization 
program.
While emphasizing the stimulation of investment in the 
private sector, the crucial role of the state in national 
economy was not given up. State enterprises and the public 
sectors was still the dominate force in the expansion of key 
industrial sectors, including the power supply, 
transportation system, urban infrastructure, and heavy 
industries --especially steel, mining, and petrochemicals. 
Whereas private sector investments were required to satisfy 
the social objectives announced by the government such as 
providing more equitable income distribution on a regional, 
sectoral, and personal basis. In other words, private sector 
firms operated their businesses not completely on the basis 
of free market principles, but under the direction of the 
state. The state was still a vital force in Brazil's economic 
development.
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While considering productivity and efficiency, high-speed 
growth was still the most important goal of economic 
development. The target growth rate per year of Brazil during 
that period was set at 7%,
While shifting to a more liberal foreign trade policy, 
selective protection for some basic industries was still 
considered necessary and was continued in the forms of 
taxation and credit privilege.
While adopting classical methods to correct the distortions 
in the price structure, Brazil rejected the shock treatment 
recommended by the IMF, which was generally a monetarist 
solution. Theoretically speaking, gradualism was a 
structuralist approach. Structuralists believed that
the shock treatment required for stability might well result 
in drastic unemployment, cutback of essential investment 
programs of the government, or restriction of credit to such 
a degree that financial panic and business failures would 
ensue" (Syvrus, 1974:42).
Therefore, Brazil's option was, in nature, a combination of 
structuralism and neo-classicism. One the one hand, it 
continued to protect domestic industries and strengthen their 
capacity of production though an ISI strategy. On the other 
hand, it carried out neo-classical economic policies for 
deflation, as well adjustment of resources distribution 
imbalances. This joint strategy was a product of compromise 
between the liberal theoretical framework of stabilization
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and Brazilian economic and political realities. It was based 
predominantly on an assessment of what was economically, 
politically and administratively feasible in the Brazilian 
context.
In short, the strategic option of stabilization program in 
1964 was a mixture of classical economic analysis, state 
intervention and effective constraints. As we well known, 
this approach was clearly reflected in the main policies of 
the stabilization program.
4.2. PBRFORXANCB OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM
All policies in the stabilization program were designed to 
stop inflation, promote exports and reduce deficits in the 
balance of payments. The overall goal was to resume high­
speed growth.
The immediate problem confronting the Gastello Branco 
government was to stop inflation, which during the first 
three months of 1964 reached an annual rate of 140% (Syvrud, 
1974:37). A set of typical financial policies for 
stabilization were adopted: a curtailment of government 
expenditures, an increase of tax revenues, a tightening of 
credit, and squeezing the wage sector. These policies were 
designed to reduce the demand for consumer goods, so 
deflating the price level. At same time tight monetary and
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credit policies were associated with financial policy as a 
residual instrument.
Foreign trade policy was considered to be central Importance 
by post-1964 governments as a means of reducing the deficit 
in the balance of payments. The rapid growth and 
diversification of exports was deemed essential to the 
recovery and long-term health of the Brazilian economy. To 
achieve these goals the government adopted a number of 
policies, including the abolition of state export taxes, 
simplification of administrative procedures for exporters, 
and the introduction of tax incentives and subsidized credit.
To reduce state subsidies to public sectors, Brazil made a 
great effort to modernize and strengthen its capital markets 
(Bare, 1976:48). In addition. Tax incentives were used to 
influence the allocation of resources among regions and 
sectors.
Another significant policy was to maintain government 
investments. Government investment expenditures were never 
cut back d u n  ~ the stabilization years. Existing 
infrastructure projects were continued. This policy, 
theoretically speaking, was in the opposite direction to 
other policies for stabilization. It reflected the eager
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desire of the Brazilian government to increase the growth 
rate.
It is well known that the stabilization program adopted in 
1964 brought a remarkable seven-year boom in Brazil beginning 
in 1968 -- the famous “economic miracle". Here I will just 
briefly review four important aspects of the national economy 
related to the goals of Brazilian stabilization: the gross 
domestic product(GDP), the rate of inflation, foreign trade 
and investment in fixed capital.
The average annual growth rate of the GDF in the period of 
"economic miracle" was 11.4% (see Table 4.1), which was the 
highest among all countries in the world at the time.
Table 4.1 Growth Rate of Real GDP, Real GDP Per
Capita,Industry and Inflation (Peroentagea)
Years Real GDP Real GDP 
Per Capita
Industry Inflation
1 9 6 8 9 . 3 6 . 3 1 5 . 0 8 2 . 2
1 9 6 9 9 . 0 5 . 9 1 1 . 0 2 0 . 2
1 9 7 0 9 . 5 6 . 4 1 1 . 1 2 2 . 1
1 9 7 1 1 1 . 3 8 . 2 1 1 . 2 2 0 . 5
1 9 7 2 1 0 . 4 7 . 3 1 3 . 8 1 8 . 4
1 9 7 3 1 1 . 4 8 . 3 1 5 . 0 1 6 . 1
1 9 7 4 9 . 6 6 . 5 8 . 2 I S . 5
Source: calculated from IMF, International Financial
Statistics.selected issues.
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This remarkable growth was an industry-led growth (see Table 
4.1). Industry was expanding at an average growth rate of 
12.2% per annum, peaking in 1973 at 15%. The growth rate in 
industry was much higher than in other sectors. Further 
observation on the growth rate within industrial sectors 
explained the structural development of Brazilian industry 
over this period. The highest growth rates were achieved by 
such sub-sectors as transportation equipment, machinery and 
electrical equipment, while traditional sectors like 
textiles, clothing, and food products experienced much slower 
rates of growth (see Table 4.2). In other words, the 
expansion of Brazilian industries was concentrated in 
consumer durable goods and chemicals sectors, which grew at 
an impressive rate of 22.9% per year.
As far as Brazil’s foreign trade position is concerned, the 
post-1964 policies, in contrast to the policy in the 1950s, 
opened the economy to foreign trade. External trade grew at 
rates substantially higher than the growth of the economy as 
a whole. In the years 1970/73 the average yearly growth rate 
of exports was 14.7% and the growth rate of imports was 21%. 
Export volume more than doubled. The purchasing power of 
exports rose 151.% (Syvrud, 1974:44).
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Tftble 4.2 Average Annual Growth Rate of Individual 
Sectors
(percent)
1968-79 1971 1972 1973 1974
Nonmetal minerals 17.3 11.1 13.7 16.4 15.1
Metal products 14.4 5.6 12.1 6.3 4.3
Machinery 22.7 3.6 18.9 27.8 11.6
Electrical equipment 13.4 21.3
Transport equipment 32.6 19.0 22.5 27.6 19.1
Paper and paper products 9.1 6.3 7.0 10.1 3.5
Rubber products 15.3 11.8 13.0 12.4 10.5
Chemicals 15.6 13.6 16.3 22.3 8.5
Textiles 7.4 8.8 4.1 6.4 -2.8
Clothing, shoes, etc. 1.7 -1.8
Food products 8.3 3.6 13.3 9.6 4.4
Beverages 8.2 4.8
Tobacco 9.6 5.7
Total Manufacturing 14.2 11.6 13.6 15.8 7.1
Construction 14.4 8.4 13.0 15.4a 11.2&
Public utilities 12.2 N.A. 11.1 12.5& 12.0'
a: Estimates based on January-November results in 1973 and 
1974
N.A. = Not available 
Source: Same as Table 4.1
The rate of inflation declined from 8.2% in 1964 to 16.1% in 
1973. Investments in fixed capital increased from 16.2% of 
GDP in 1967 to 21.4% in 1973.
The structure of exports and imports was continuously 
diversified in the 1970's. Coffee exports as a percentage of 
total exports declined to 12.6 percent in 1974; sugar rose 
from 5.0 percent in 1965-69 to 15.8 percent in 1974; 
manufactures increased to 27.7 percent; soybeans which were 
not a part of Brazil's export structure in the mid-1960s
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stood at 7.4 percent in 1974. The import commodity structure 
was noted for the growth of capital goods, whose portion of 
total imports rose from about 31 percent in the mid-1960s to 




1965-69 1968-72 1973 1974
Coffee 42.0 32.6 21.7 12.6
Iron ore 6.1 6.7 5.9 7.2
Soybean -  — 1.6 8.0 7.4
Sugar 5.0 6.5 8.9 15.8
Meat 1.9 3.3 3.1 0.9
Manufactures 7.2 15.8 22.0 27.7
Other 37.8 33.5 30.4 28.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Piordan Roett (ed). Brazil in the Seventies. 1976, 
p.50.
Obviously, all important economic statistics regarding these 
four aspects showed a prosperous picture. Some economists 
were so optimistic that they predicted in the early 1970s 
that in later years Brazil would surpass Britain (Jaguaribe, 
1973:462). However, a closer look at the change in Brazilian 
economic structure showed another side to this economic boom: 
a deeper involvement in the international economy.
First, as the Brazilian economy was opened to the 
international market, national industries were gradually 
internationalized. Vehicle industrialization in key sectors 
led to the internationalization of internal market. Secondly,
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Brazilian growth in this period was largely financed by the 
foreign capital. During the period from 1969-1973, foreign 
exchange reserves increased from $400 million to 6.8 
billion. Both foreign debts and foreign direct investments 
increased rapidly. The net official and private capital 
inflow of direct investment grew from a yearly average of US$ 
84 million in the period of 1965-69 to $ 977 and $944 million 
in the years 1973 and 1974, respectively. Net foreign loans 
increased more, from a yearly average of $604 million in 
1965-69 to $4.5 and $6.6 billion in 1973 and 1974. Third, 
foreign trade played a more important role in the national 
economy. The foreign trade coefficients, that is the 
export/GDP and import/GDP ratios, were increased, especially 
in the early 1970s (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Brazil's Export and Import Coefficient rj 
(percent)
1950 1961 1964 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Export/GDP 9.2 6.0 5.1 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.0
Import/GDP 7.4 7.4 5.4 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 14.0
Source : Same as Table 4.3.
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4.3. ANALYSIS OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM
In the discussion in Chapter two, I pointed out that the 
Brazilian stagnation before 1964 fundamentally came from the 
constraints of the colonial economy -- Lack of capital for 
the original accumulation needed for a rapid 
industrialization. These constraints were released by ISI 
with a redistribution of capital favouring the growth of 
industry. However, in both theory and practice, the expansion 
of reproduction in the long run was finally supported by an 
adequate increase in the rate of capital accumulation formed 
in the industrial sectors rather than by the redistribution 
of limited capital. Since the production circle of basic 
industries was longer than that of other sectors, internal 
accumulation needed more time. Before "development became a 
cumulative circular process creating its own expansionary 
momentum" (Furtado, 1965:108), ISI exhausted its potential. 
Therefore my conclusion in Chapter one was that although the 
expansion policy of ISI sharpened the contradictions in the 
process of ISI, economic stagnation with high inflation and 
seriously unbalanced income distribution before 1964 was 
rooted in the lack of capital and the needs for speedy 
industrialization.
Facing this practical obstacle to economic development, as in 
the 1950s, Brazil still had two options: reliance on
international capital accumulation though the expansion of
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domestic industries and the market, which was the core 
thinking of isi, or the pursuit of external capital and 
markets, which was supported by the stabilization strategy.
Brazil chose the latter as a means of resuming its high speed 
industrialization. The Discussion in the last section 
indicated that this strategy influenced Brazilian economic 
development in two ways: an astonishing growth rate and the 
internationalization of industry. Notwithstanding the 
positive impact of the former, the latter led Brazil's 
economy in the direction of dependent development.
Some literature used the export-oriented economy to describe 
the stabilization strategy. In my opinion, this is not 
accurate. The concept of "export-oriented" itself can only 
describe the framework of an economy, but not its nature and 
degree of dependency. There are possibly different kinds of 
developments under the export-oriented economic model. For 
example, the U.S.A. is an open economy which depends on 
foreign trade. However, it is in a position of economic power 
and independently stands in the international economy. But 
for some developing countries, the situation has been quite 
the opposite; their economies were significantly controlled 
in different ways by other countries. The nature of an open 
economy in term of dependency can be measured in two ways. 
One is the capacity of an economy to decide its own
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development strategy The other is the ability to adopt 
alternatives when external conditions change.
What is the nature of Brazilian development in the 1970s? 
Some scholars such as Ronald Chilcote, Marcio Moreira Alves 
and Helio Jaguaribe see Brazil as a prototype case of 
diluting or abandoning the quest for national autonomy in 
order to realize the benefits of capitalist industrialization 
and development^. Some other analysts such as Stefan Robock 
and Alastair Buchan, Robert A. Packenham hold a totally 
opposite view. They see Brazilian dependency to be waning and 
Brazil as on the way toward great power status.  ̂ In my 
opinion, Brazil experienced a transformation toward dependent 
development in its industrialization process. This conclusion 
implies two points:
 ̂Ronald L. Chilcote. Book Review of Frank D.McCann, The Brazilian- 
American Alliance . 1937-1945.. Princeton, New Mersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1973; Marcio Moreira Alves. A Grain of Mustard 
Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1973; Helio Jaguaribe. Brazil: Crisis of 
Alternatives. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar 1974.
2 Stefan H. Robock. " Realizing the miracle", Saturday Review. Oct. 
18,1975, p.30; Alastair Buchan.The End of the Postwar Era: A New 
Balance of World Power. London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974; 
Robert A. Packenhim. Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 
1964 . Washington. D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1976.
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(1) Brazil was still an independent economy in the 1970s 
period of its development;
(2) Brazil was experiencing a transformation from an 
independent to a dependent form of development.
The real process of Brazilian economic growth in 1970s 
miracle was realized under the interaction of two forces: the 
independent elements of economic independent development and 
dependency.
Brazilian growth in the 1970s was largely due to the impact 
of government programs. Government expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP had grown from 17.1 percent in 1947 to 37.0 
percent in 1973. The government sector accounted for over 60% 
percent of Brazilian fixed investment in 1969. State 
enterprises dominated key sectors such as steel, mining, and 
petrochemicals. They controlled over 80 percent of power- 
generating capacity and most of the public utilities. It has 
been estimated that in 1974 for the 100 largest firms, 74 
percent of the combined assets belonged to state enterprises. 
While for the 5113 largest firms, only half as much -- 37 
percent -- of the assets belonged to state enterprises (Bare, 
1973) .
The high degree of involvement of the Brazilian government in 
the industrialization process was the result of nat: nalism 
implied in the ISI Strategy. The dominant role of state in
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the 1970s economic development provided Brazil a solid basis 
for determining its own development strategy and main 
development policies. The combination choice of stabilization 
was an evidence of this power. Although strongly influenced 
by classical economics, it was not determined by external 
forces, but based on Brazil's economic and political 
reality. In practice, with a relatively stronger economic 
power Brazil played an important role in international
economic and political activities, and was in a leading
position in the third world during this period.
However, the Brazilian economy did not expand in a completely 
self-reliant way. From the discussion in Section two of this 
chapter, it is clear that foreign capital was more and more 
involved in Brazilian economy after 1964, eroding the
independence which was half way towards self-sustained
development. The consolidation of the internal market under 
ISI was followed by the internationalization of the domestic 
market under stabilization.
As mentioned in last section, the Brazilian economy has been 
much more open since 1964, leading to a dramatic expansion of 
external penetration. The most obvious development here was 
the Brazilian reliance on foreign capital. The yearly average 
of foreign debt in the years of 1960-1964 was less than $3 
billion. In 1972 the figure reached $10 billion, and by the 
end of 1975, it was over 22 billion (Bar^u
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197 6:94),increasing about seven times. Foreign direct 
investment also significantly increased from a yearly average 
of $70 million in 1960-1964 to $770 million in 1972-1974 
(Bare, 1976:95), a tenfold increase. Both indicators 
experienced a significantly greater increase than the growth 
of the Brazilian economy as a whole. Over the same period, 
the national debt increased about sevenfold. Although there 
was is exact information about the proportion of foreign 
capital accounted for in the total capital formation, this 
phenomenon indicates the trend that more and more Brazilian 
capital accumulation was supported by the inflow of foreign 
capital, which in turn increased Brazil's dependency.
While more and more foreign capital entered the Brazilian 
economy, some residuals of the colonial structure could 
still be observed in the foreign trade structure. On the 
export side, as more diversified exports replaced single 
product exports, agricultural product exports were still 49%. 
Manufacturing exports mainly involved primary industrial 
products. On the import side, Brazil relied on the import of 
raw materials and equipment needed in the industrialization 
process. These imports were significant not because c :} ■. 
lack of natural resources, but because of the limited 
development in raw material production. Because those imports 
were necessary inputs into the industrialization process, 
before domestic production capacity was strong enough to meet
62
demand, the greater the industrial expansion, the greater 
need for such imports.
The increased reliance of the Brazilian economy on 
international capital and the world market undermined 
Brazil's ability search for and adoption of strategic 
alternatives policies when external conditions changed. In 
other words, as the degree of dependency increased, the 
Brazilian economy was placed in a vulnerable position. By 
1974, external debts had reached US$ 22 billion (Cline, 
1976:71), becoming one of the crucial obstacles in the 
process of Brazilian development.
This dependency of the Brazilian economy in the 1970s took a 
different form from a classical dependency in three aspects. 
First, this dependency was not realized with unequal 
international commodities exchange through the control of the 
prices, but with the direct investment of foreign capital 
through the control of production. Second, the direct 
political and economic control of core countries over 
colonial countries was replaced by an indirect control of 
economic power over the production process. Thirdly, the 
economic structure of peripheral countries changed from mono- 
cultural agricultural export to primary-manufacturing exports 
following the technology revolution which dramatically 
changed international economic relations.
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This different picture of dependency was a product of the new 
international division of labour, As mentioned in the first 
chapter, in the 1970s the world economy was in the second 
phase of internationalization. Following the development of 
new technology, more and more traditional manufacturing moved 
to developing countries. Although the international division 
of labour shifted substantially on the surface, the 
fundamental effect remained the same. A theory of the 
"product life cycle model" explains this point well; New 
products are to be first produced and sold in the centre, 
later produced in the centre and exported to the periphery, 
and finally produced in the periphery. Over time, more and 
more products will be manufactured in the periphery. However, 
production moves to the periphery only after the technology 
involved has become routinized. At this point, windfall 
profits associated with new products, had already been 
obtained by the centre. The peripheries are forced to rely on 
the low cost of their labour to maintain a comparative 
advantage in the international market, which leads to low 
living standards. The introduction of manufacturing on the 
peripheries lacks the traditional "multiplier effect" 
associated with manufacturing investments in the centre. 
Firms in dependent countries buy their equipment and other 
capital goods from the outside, so that the "multiplier 
effect" of new investments is transferred back to the centre. 
Increases in the output of export sectors do not feed back 
into the peripheral economy in the same way that they would
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feed back into a core economy (Evans, 1969). It is clear that 
such development will not benefit peripheries in self­
accumulation. Evans defined such development as dependent 
development. The stabilization program in Brazil is a case in 
point.
Another important point in the Brazilian case was that such 
dependency development was realised through an alliance 
between the state and international capital. This feature 
developed from the combination choice of stabilization. The 
penetration of foreign capital could not be realized around 
the state because of the dominant role of the state in 
Brazil's development. Most direct investment of foreign 
capital, specially in key sectors dominated by public 
enterprise, took the form of joint ventures between 
multinationals and state enterprises.
A large amount of the debt also took the fqrm of national 
loans which were then distributed to various groups. In this 
alliance, the state functioned in two ways: On the one side, 
acting as an independent element against multinationals, it 
protected the interest of the nation,* on the other hand, as a 
profit sharer it submitted to the demands of international 
capital.
The last question about stabilization is: "how could the
Brazilian economy achieve such a positive result while in
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such a vulnerable position? The answer is that the Brazilian 
economy was operating under favourable internal and external 
conditions. Within the country, a relatively strong 
industrial base was already established in the ISI period. 
Meanwhile external conditions were favourable to the 
development of Brazil. The world economy, especially the 
industrial world, was expanding. Output growth increased 
dramatically in the advanced countries; world trade rapidly 
expanded; primary commodity prices improved. More important, 
the high liquidity in the international monetary system and, 
especially in the private banking system, provided Brazil 
with plenty of capital.
Under these conditions, the combination choice of 
stabilization took the advantages of both development 
strategies: with plenty of intentional capital supplies the 
economy boomed on the basis of the basic industrial 
infrastructure established in the ISI period. In this sense 
Brazil found a good balance between two opposite development 
strategies in resolving its dilemma in the industrialization 
process.
However, the potential weakness of stabilization was still 
there because of the lack of capacity for self-accumulation 
and over reliance on the foreign capital, Brazil was deprived 
of a lot of surplus generated in the country and transferred 
to the centre. Development was also constrained by the
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external environment, which would finally damage Brazilian 
economic development. The crisis after the two oil shocks 
exposed this weakness, dimming the shining achievement of 
the Economic Miracle.
CONCLUSION
The strategy of stabilization program introduced neo­
classical principles and policies into Brazil and mixed them 
with ISI policies. Under a favourable international 
environment, this combined strategy worked very well in terms 
of economic growth, bringing about Brazil's famous "economic 
miracle". However, as this strategy opened Brazil's economy 
to the international market, Brazil's industries were 
gradually internationalized, and more and more dependent on 
foreign capital, the main financial resources for its 
industrialization process. As more and more foreign capital 
penetrated Brazil's economy, it gradually entered a new 
international division of labour and moved away from inward- 
oriented strategy of self-reliant development implied in ISI. 
Since then it has entered into a dependent development 
process. Brazil's economy, although growing at a high speed, 
was vulnerable to the external environment and became highly 
reliant on external capital.
67
CHAPTER V
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AFTER THE OIL CHOCKS
After the first oil shock, Brazil's external terms of trade 
deteriorated 18.2% in 1973/74 due to quarter-times increase 
of the oil price (See Table 5.1). This drastic deterioration 
in the external terms of trade (See table 5.2) resulted in a 
substantial deceleration of economic growth in Brazil. The 
growth rate of GDP significantly declined from 14% in 1973 to 
9.0 % in 1974, and 5.2 % in 1975. (See Table 5.3). The growth 
rate of industry fell from 16.6% in 1973 to 7.8 % in 1974, 
and 3.8 % in 1975 (See Table 5.4). The deficit in the current 
account was increased to US $ 1688 million in 1973, and $7211 
million in 1974 (See Table 5.5). The inflation rate climbed 
to 34.3 in 1974 (See Table 5.6). In order to sustain its 
growth rate and to avoid recession, Brazil initiated its 
macroeconomic adjustment.
Brazil's adjustment can be divided into two main phases. The 
first phase began after the first oil crisis and marked by 
the Second National Development Plan (II NDP) with growth- 
cum-debt strategy. The second phase began after the second 
oil shock and characterized by orthodox adjustment policies.
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In this chapter, I will first review the course of this 
adjustment, then discuss its impact on the dependency of 
Brazil's economy.
Table 5.1 Brazil's Crude 
(US$/barrel)
Oil Import Prices
Year US$/barrel Year US$/barrel
1977 12.3 1982 32.9
1978 12.4 1983 29.4
1979 17.1 1984 28.6
1980 29.5 1985 27.4
1981 34.4 1986 12.7
Source: Batista, Jorge Chami. 
in Brazil. 1992.
Debt. aad...AdiuslmenL r.oli.cia
Table 5.2 Brazil's Price Index of 
Trade
(Based on Price in US$
External terms ( 
and 1977-100)
Year Terms of Trade Year Terms of Trade
1966 81.5 1977 100
1967 79.7 1978 87.5
1968 76.3 1979 78.9
1969 80.0 1980 65.3
1970 88.7 1981 55.3
1971 82.3 1982 53.7
1972 87.1 1983 53.7








Source: Same as Table 5.1,
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Table 5.3 Rate of Growth of 
Aggregate Demand 
per annum) and Foreign Debt
Selected 
( in üS$
Component a i 
million)
Year Investment Exports Imports GDP Net foreign Debt
1971 14.10 5.50 24.50 11.30
1972 16.50 24.20 20.00 12.10
1973 12.10 14.30 20.40 14.00 6154.8
1974 16.50 2.30 28.50 9.00 11896.6
1975 10.10 11.60 -4.50 5.20 17130.9
1976 0.50 -0.30 -1.20 9.80 19441.5
1977 -0.30 -0.40 -7.60 4.60 24781.1
1978 1.50 13.30 4.60 4.80 31615.6
1979 1.00 9.30 8.20 7.20 40215.5
1980 11.70 22.70 0.60 9.10 46934.9
1981 -14.00 21.30 -12.30 -3.40 53904.0
1982 -7.80 -9.20 -6.00 0.90 66203.5
1983 -23.30 14.30 -17.40 -2.50 76756.2
1984 - 22.10 -3.00 5.70 79096.0
1985 - 6.90 0.00 8.30 84248.7
Source: Same as Table 5.1,
T#bl# 5.4 Rate of Growth of Manufacturing Induatry 
(in % per annum)
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Year Rate of Growth Year Rate of Growth
1 9 6 7 1 . 6 1 9 7 8 1 6 . 1
1 9 6 8 1 7 . 0 1 9 7 9 6 . 9
1 9 6 9 1 0 . 5 1 9 8 0 9 . 1
1 9 7 0 1 0 . 4 1 9 8 1 - 1 0 . 4
1 9 7 1 1 1 . 9 1 9 8 2 - 0 . 4
1 9 7 2 1 4 . 0 1 9 8 3 - 6 . 1
1 9 7 3 1 6 . 6 1 9 8 4 6 . 1
1 9 7 4 7 . 8 1 9 8 5 8 . 3
1 9 7 5 3 . 8 1 9 8 6 1 1 . 4
1 9 7 6 1 2 . 1 1 9 8 7 1 . 0
1 9 7 7 2 . 3
Source : Same as Table 5 . 1 .
Tabla 5.5 Current Account Deficits
Year Current Account Year Current Account
1 9 6 7 - 2 3 7 1 9 7 7 - 4 0 3 7
1 9 6 8 - 5 0 8 1 9 6 8 - 5 9 2 7
1 9 6 9 - 2 8 1 1 9 7 9 - 1 0 0 2 1
1 9 7 0 - 5 6 2 1 9 8 0 - 1 2 4 5 6
1 9 7 1 - 1 3 0 7 1 9 8 1 - 1 0 9 9 3
1 9 7 2 - 1 4 8 9 1 9 8 2 - 1 4 7 1 7
1 9 7 3 - 1 6 8 8 1 9 8 3 - 5 5 9 3
1 9 7 4 - 7 1 2 2 1 9 8 4 4 9 5
1 9 7 5 - 6 7 0 0 1 9 8 5 3 0 2
1 9 7 6 - 5 9 7 8 1 9 8 6 - 4 0 2 8
R n i i r r e  • S p  1 e r t  e d f  r n m B a t  i a f . a . JoraeChami . Debtand
Adjustment Policies in Brazil. 1 9 9 2 .
Table 5.6 Rate of Inflation in Brazil (% per annu
Year GDP Deflator Year GDP Deflator
1 9 7 0 1 6 . 4 1 9 7 9 5 5 . 6
1 9 7 1 2 0 . 4 1 9 8 0 9 1 . 7
1 9 7 2 1 9 . 5 1 9 8 1 1 0 2 . 5
1 9 7 3 2 2 . 6 1 9 8 2 9 2 . 9
1 9 7 4 3 4 . 3 1 9 8 3 1 5 1 . 9
1 9 7 5 3 3 . 9 1 9 8 4 2 1 0 . 5
1 9 7 6 4 7 . 4 1 9 8 5 2 3 4 . 8
1 9 7 7 4 6 . 2 1 9 8 6 1 4 2 . 4
Sourceî Same as Table 5.1.
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5.1. THE FIRST ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE FIRST OIL CHOCK
in September 1974, in order to deal with increased deficits 
in the BOP and to restore the growth rate of GDP, General 
Geisel's government issued the Second National Development 
Plan (II GDP) with the target of sustaining a rapid expansion 
of the gross domestic product at a growth rate of 10% per 
year between 1974 to 1979.
This plan designed a medium and long-term strategy which 
emphasized the need to make a significant change in the 
structure of the economy. Joao, Paulo Dos Reis Velloso, the 
minister of Economic Planning in Geisel's Administration in 
1973/74 explained the thinking behind this strategy in this 
way:
Given the inflexibility of Brazil's import 
structure in 1973/74, heavily concentrated on 
industrial raw materials, petroleum, and capital 
goods, a recessive adjustment strategy following 
the first oil shock would not have solved Brazil's 
external imbalance. A recessing would certainly have 
reduced Brazil's deficits on current account of the 
balance of payments. But once the economy eventually 
resumed growth, the external imbalance would have 
reappeared. Brazil 's external imbalance required a 
structure change with new and large investments in 
capital goods and basic intermediate guilds which 
would not been feasible in a recessive environment." 
(Batista, 1992:4)
On the basis of this thinking, the government placed a higher 
priority on long-term structural adjustment and sustaining
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growth than on dealing with financial disequilibrium with a 
short-term recession policy (Griffith and Rodrigue, 1984:61). 
Brazil used various mechanisms for import control, such as 
the prohibition of imports of 'superfluous' items, an 
increase in tariffs, high deposits on many imports, and 
additional incentives for import substitution, as well as 
subsidies for certain types of exports so as to increase 
investment and to promote exports.(Kaplinley; 1984:60-63)
Under this plan, the investment policy was consistent with 
the objective of increasing the economy's capacity to produce 
international goods competitively and increasing the 
production of competitive international goods both for 
domestic consumption, as well as for exports. Investment was 
encouraged mainly in three major priority areas:
(1) the production of capital goods and basic 
intermediate goods;
(2) import substitution in energy; and
(3) infrastructure development in transportation and 
communication (II NDP).
In order to sustain a rapid expansion of the GDP under 
deteriorating international and domestic conditions, NDP II 
emphasized the needs to absorb a substantial inflow of 
foreign capital. According to the Plan, Brazil would rely on 
the foreign capital to finance the increase of the trade and 
current account deficits in the first few years, which could
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subsequently increase the foreign debt. However, as this 
inflow of external finance would be used to increase the 
level of investment and sustain the growth of the gross 
domestic proouct in line with the desired change in the 
structure of the economy, the exports would be finally raised 
and the imports would be reduced. With this tendency, 
sufficient foreign exchange was expect à to be generated in 
the medium and long-term to repay and eventually eliminate 
the debt. Tha^ was the growth-cum-debt strategy in the II NDP
(Batista, 1987 and 1992) .
Recognizing the existing limits o foreign indebtedness and 
the obligation to the repayment of debt in the future 
decades, the II NDP also stressed the need for a rapid
improvement in the balance of payments. It emphasized that 
while borrowing from abroad importance should be "attached to 
gradually channeling foreign lo. .s to areas which could
enhance the country's capacity to export or to replace 
imports"(II NDP: 19). Guidelines for the current account 
deficits and foreign indebtedness was given in the II NDP:
(1) The inflow of foreign saving as measured by the 
current account deficit would be limited to a maximum of 20% 
of gross capital formation;
(2) foreign indebtedness would be managed so as to 
maintain an adequate ratio between foreign debt and exports 
and a prudent debt profile;
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(3) International reserves would be kept at high level 
so as to preserve the country's credit worthiness and to 
protect the balance of payments against unforeseen 
developments in world trade (II NDP: 121).
In practice, the accumulation currency account deficit was 
over 30 million US$ in the period between 1974-1979. These 
deficits were largely financed by debt-creating capital. 
Outstanding borrowing by Brazilian banks over the period 
1979 to 1982 soared from US$ 7.7 billion to 16.1 billion 
(Jeffry 1987:118), and most of the debt-secured capital 
served the expansion of basic industries.
To carry out this growth-cum-debt strategy, the pi au 
emphasized a joint action among state-owned, private 
domestically owned and foreign enterprises as an essential 
element of the II NDP strategy.
The government was keen to attract private investment to the 
areas established as priorities. It gave incentives to the 
private sector such as lower taxation, restriction o: import 
and export subsidies, provided subsidized credit basically 
through official institutions to encourage operations of 
large national private corporations,(II NDP:43)
Foreign enterprises were expected to perform the following 
functions :
75
(1) to develop new export markets;
(2) to contribute to the development of technological 
research in Brazil;
(3) to retrain from market control practices and from 
the absorption of competitions, (II NDP;45)
The government's responsibility was focused on two areas:
(1) infrastructure sectors such as energy, 
transportation and communications;
(2) the area of social development such as education, 
health and social services(NDP II, p.45).
In brief, the II NDP advocated a mixed economy where state, 
private, national and foreign enterprises played important 
roles, each in their own spheres of operations.
In spite of fluctuations between 1976 of 1977, the II NDP 
brought about a weak temporary recovery in Brazil's economy. 
From 1974 to 1980, the overall expansion of output was at a 
satisfactory level. The growth rate of investment increased 
from 0.5 in 1976 to 11.7% in 1980, The average growth rate of 
GDP was 7% and well above that of most developing countries 
and industrial countries. The growth rate of exports 
increased from -0.3 in 1976 to 22.7% in 1980, while the 
growth rate of imports was reduced during the same period, 
although it did not move in a stable way (See Table 5.3)
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However, since the large amount of foreign capital inflow 
from 1974 to 1978 Brazil experienced a balance of payments 
deficit on its current account every year in this period, the 
deficit of POE sharply increased and reached US$ 30.8
billion. This huge deficit was financed by and large through 
loans and credits. As a result, the net foreign debt
continued to rise during the period of adjustment, although 
the exports increase and imports decrease over the same 
period (See Table 5.3).
5 . 2 .  THE SECOND ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE SECOND O IL  SHOCK
The second rise in the price of oil rekindled a trade balance 
deficit which once again met with as increased interest rate,
pushing Brazil into its debt crisis.
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Brazilian economy 
confronted a dramatic deterioration in its international 
economic environment. Brazil's economy was first hit by the 
sudden rise in the price of oil (See Table 5.1) and 
international interest rates (See Table 5.7), then by the 
stagnation of world trade, finally lay a near-total cut off of 
voluntary new lending following the adoption of very 
restrictive monetary policies in the advanced economics 
(Frienden, 1987).
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Table 5.7 Real Rates Of Interest (in % per month)
Year Real Rates of Interest Year Real Rates of interest
1977 0.77 1982 2.42
1978 3,26 1983 1.77
1979 -4.50 1984 0.76
1980 -0.59 1985 1.18
1981 2.90 1986 0.17
Source: From Batista, Jorge Chami. Debt and Adjustment
Policies in Brazil. 1992.
As interest rates soared, Brazilian net interest payment 
tripled times from $2.7 billion in 1978 to 9.2 Billion in 
1981, while the country's net debt increased by 70%. 
Meanwhile, the country's exports were faced with the general 
stagnation of world trade after 1980. Brazil's terms of trade 
decreased 30 percent between 1979 and 1981. By 1981 debt 
service payments equaled 72% percent of Brazil's exports, up 
from 51 percent in 1977 (Alejandro, 1986) . More seriously, 
while Brazil badly needed more financial resources to roll­
over its debts, international private financial resources 
dried up after 1982. Unable to repay for its previous debts 
Brazil jumped into its debt crisis. The debt problem became 
the dominant and determinant element of Brazil's economy.
It was this debt crisis that forced Brazil to negotiate an 
agreement with the IMF, which led to a complete turn towards 
the orthodox structural adjustment process. The IMP insisted 
that Brazil's growing deficit was largely caused by its over-
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ambitious expansion policies and its unbalanced growth model, 
as well as the market distortion caused by improper 
government policy (Pastor, 1987). The shock recession policy 
was introduced in order to cure the deficit problem. Since 
then the strategy in the second national development plan was 
completely reversed: the balance-of-payment replaced growth 
as the main concern under SAP strategy.
Since the theories and conditions of SAP were introduced in 
Chapter Two, I will not discuss them here, in Brazil's case, 
in order to quickly get rid of the crisis, an aggressive 
exchange rate policy and expansionary fiscal policy was 
adopted, and the main policy instruments to deflate the 
economy was the domestic rate of interest with a combination 
of restrictive credit policies to the private sector and 
tight control of the expansion of money supply (Batista, 
1992).
Faced with adverse international conditions, the government 
first devalued the cruzeiro by 30 percent. Then various 
policies were implemented to keep foreign finance coming into 
the country. The most important was the drastic raising of 
domestic interest rates, which soon surpassed 50% in real 
terms for consumer credit. Domestic credit was controlled 
while foreign borrowing was exempted from any quantitative 
limits. Substantial interest-rate subsidies were also offered 
to energy-related and export activities. Domestic firms
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outside these favoured sectors were permitted and thus pushed 
to increase their foreign borrowing. At the same time, the 
government reduced government investment spending to overcome 
the widening gap in the balance of payment. (Frieden, 
1987:116-118). To reduce the deficit, investment in the 
public sector was also seriously cut off (Rocha, 1992:84).
The macro-performance of Brazil after the second adjustment 
was not successful. The main macro-criteria set by the IMF 
for SAPS such as the rate of growth, inflation, external 
debt, public sector deficits, were disappointing except for 
the trade balance account.
As the result of recession policies, Brazil's manufacturing 
production dropped 10 percent in 1981, stagnated in 1982, and 
dropped a further 8 percent in 1983. Output of the capital 
goods sectors fell 19 percent in 1981, 11 percent in 1982, 
and another 20 percent in 1983. The growth rate of GDP fell 
to a negative level of -3.4 (Batista, 1992),
One of the main goals of adjustment in Brazil was to decrease 
inflation. However the recessive policies and structural 
policies which had been implemented since 1974 were 
ineffective in this aspect. The reduction in the rate of 
inflation in 1981/1982 was relatively minor, then continued 
to rise, peaking at 234.8% in 1985 (See Table 5.6).
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Although the Current account sharply improved (See Table 5.5) 
because of a slight increase in exports and a decrease in 
imports, the public sectors account seriously deteriorated. 
The percentage of public sector deficit, as a percentage of 
the GDP rose to 12% in 1989 from 6.6% in 1982. (See Table 
5.8)
In the 1990s the federal government accepted the Washington 
Consensus and started its privatization and liberation 
reforms which constituted a continuing of the structural 
adjustment. This reform was aimed simply to fundamentally 
change Brazil economy from a state-led economy into a free 
market economy. Between October 1991 to August 1992, 13
state-owned enterprises were sold at a low price to the 
private sector. Foreign investors were allowed to acquire 51% 
or more of the voting shares of sold companies (Rocha, 1992).
TABLE 5.8 Macroeconomic Performance in Brazil, 1982- 
1989
GDP Inflation PublicSector Exports Imports External External 
Deficit (US$ mil)(US$ mil) Debt Debt
(% of Year %change) (as % of
GDP)
1982 0.7 100.3 6.6 20,173 19,395 62,221 35.8
1983 -3,4 178.0 3.0 21,898 15,429 97,496 50.1
1984 5.0 209.1 2.7 27,002 13,916 104,331 52.3
1985 8.3 239.1 4.3 25,643 13,168 104,593 48.2
1986 7.5 58.6 3.6 22,348 14,044 112,042 41.7
1987 3.6 396.0 5.5 26,210 15,052 123,865 39.4
1988 0.0 994.3 4.3 33,773 14,605 114,592 30.7
1989 3.6 1,910.6 12.4 34,392 18,281 114,572 • • »
Source; Pastor, Manuel JR. Inflation. Stabilization, debt. 1992
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Substantial liberation of policies and regulations were 
granted to private sectors including multinational 
corporations. For example, foreign investors were free to 
move their profits abroad instead of waiting two years before 
sending it home; a twelve years period of capital 
repatriation was reduced to six years; taxes on capital
repatriation was reduced from 25% to 15%. However, all these
measures under the SAP failed to bring Brazil's economy out 
of heavy debts and high inflation. In order to get a new Fund 
approval for the 2.1 Billion "standby" loan. To reducing 
inflation, Brazil signed an other agreement with the IMF 
under very tight policy conditions (Rocha, 1992:82).
5.3. THE IMPACT OF THE SAP ON THE DEPENDENCY OF 
BRAZIL'a ECONOMY
The structural and recessive policies completed since 1974 
led Brazil's economy into an even more dependent position in 
its international relation through two fundamental structural 
changes in Brazil's economy: within its internal relations, 
the collapse of the public sector, and within its external 
relations, perpetual reliance on foreign capital.
Thm CQllaoae of tha Public Sactox
To explain the first change, it is necessary to review the 
evolution of policy concerning structural adjustment. As 
mentioned above, the Second National Plan intended to restore 
the high rate of growth through a joint action among the
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State, local capital and foreign capital in the first step of 
adjustment. Although the government maintained its leading 
role at the beginning of adjustment, with the acceptance of 
the orthodox economic principles, Brazil's priority was "to 
make market capitalism work" (Fishlow, 1973:80). Thus the 
government expanded both its indirect intervention (control 
of fiscal , monetary, wage, and credit policies) to "perfect" 
the market and its direct intervention (state enterprises) to 
provide important inputs to the private sector at subsidized 
prices. In this course, the government functioned as a 
"privatized" state (Rocha, 1992; 77-82). In the second
adjustment, the public sector was considered as the main 
source of inefficiency and the deficit, and thus the main 
obstacle to growth. The privatization associated with 
orthodox theory aimed at changing the state-led economy into 
a free market economy in which government should retire from 
economic activity. With the further development of the SAP in 
Brazil, the leading role of public sectors in development 
process was weakened and replaced by the private sector.
In the process of adjustment, the state performed a 
supporting role for the private sector in two ways:
(1) By transferring the public resources into the 
private sector through a subsidised price regime imposed on 
the state enterprises;
(2) By socializing the debts of the private sector via a 
quasi-insurance scheme.
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Brazil's state-owned enterprises invested primarily in those 
sectors which provided inputs or infrastructure important to 
industry, such as electrical energy, petrochemicals and 
steels. Over the adjustment period, public firms were forced 
to sell goods and services to private companies at a 
subsidised prices. For example, in 1980 the public firm 
Siderbras was allowed to increase the price of its steel by 
only 60 percent while inflation was running at about 110 
percent (Anglade, 1985:114 ). Also the electrical energy
sector was forced to donate electricity to the aluminum 
industry, whose major representative, ALCOA, is one of 
Brazil's most profitable private firms (Rocha 1992:81). 
Subsidised prices for electrical energy, petrochemicals and 
steel benefited primarily the automotive pharmaceutical, and 
chemical industries with a dominant foreign presence. In 
this way, state enterprises continued to transfer massive 
resources to the private sector, and generated massive 
losses. Between 1979 and 1989 the steel industry, for 
example, lost US$17 billion in subsidies to the private 
sector (Rocha, 1992:84).As
a result, their ability of self accumulation greatly declined 
and relied heavily on borrow funds, usually from overseas. 
The artificial low prices became the primary mechanism to 
force public firms to borrow more and more abroad. Taking the 
example of the eclectic energy and steel sectors, by the late 
1970s, 30 percent of its investment funds came from net
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operating income and half of all investment was financed 
through borrowing, almost all of it from abroad. By 1980- 
1981, debt was nearly double the equity of the sector, and 
the foreign debt accounted for three-quarters of the total. 
Public investment in the steel industry averaged $1,9 billion 
a year between 1976 and 1981, nearly 5 percent of national 
investment. However, its operating earnings financed less 
than one-fifth of steel investment in the late 1970s, half of 
it through borrowing, the majority from abroad.(Frieden, 
1987; 104-108).This happened in the same way among most state- 
owned enterprises in the petrochemical, mining, railroad, and 
telecommunications sectors. The accumulation of foreign 
debts in the public sector was so high that governments were 
forced to borrow more and more abroad just to service their 
ever-increasing debts the in 1980s.
Another way to support the private sector was the 
"Stabilization" of the foreign debt. Brazil public sector had 
run a serious of quasi-insurance scheme for private firms 
with foreign-currency liabilities. Under this scheme, 
private firms were allowed to write down their foreign debts. 
Because of this policy, private-sector foreign borrowing 
declined after 1974, meanwhile the share of public sector in 
Brazil's foreign debt climbed from 68 percent in 1981 to 
nearly 80 percent in 1985(Frieden, 1987 122). As the
financial costs increased dramatically following the soaring 
interest rates, in 1983 the state firms' financial expenses
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equaled 90 percent of their operating expenses compared with 
28 percent in 1978. The rise for domestic private firms was 
from 23 to 50 percent (Frieden, 1987:122-126). This meant the 
public sector was forced to swallow losses during the period 
of crisis.
In the 1980s, the bankrupt Brazilian state could no longer 
continue to invest in its public firms. Public investment was 
sharply reduced. The proportion of state enterprises 
investment in gross formation decreas’d from 22.5 percent in 
1980 to 9 percent 1989 and 6.3 percent in 1990 
(Bielschowshky, 1990:52). Since state enterprises
historically held 40 percent share of the economy's gross 
investment in capital-intensive infrastructure and basic- 
input sectors, and provided the structural linkages to the 
private sector, the decline of investment in public sectors 
consequently led to the overall stagnation of thi economy 
(Rocha, 1992)
Following the weakness of the public sector, the 
"privatization" began in 1992 led to the complete withdrawal 
of the state from Brazil economic activities, However, this 
withdrawal of the state will not leave local capital 
developing independently. With the internationalization of 
the domestic market, local capital in Brazil was closely 
allied with international capital and "internationalized" 
under conditions of historical and structural weakness
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(Graham, 1989). Therefore, the withdrawal finally reinforced 
external dominance, leading to a new reliance on external 
capital by shifting the leading role in national development 
from the state to "internationalized" local capital.
P#rB#tual Dependence on the Foreign Capital
From the description of the course of Brazil adjustment in
the previous section, it is obvious that the debt crisis was
one of the main reasons for Brazil's gradual acceptance of 
IMF’s orthodox development strategy. But this adjustment 
failed to rescue Brazil's economy from the debt crisis. 
Instead, it reduced the economy under an even heavier
pressure of a foreign debt burden.
To adjust the serious deficit in BOP, the second national 
development plan purposely used foreign capital as a major 
resource to finance its economic growth so as to avoid
recession, which led to a major increase in foreign borrowing 
after the first oil shock. As mentioned in the first section 
of this chapter, although the steady growth of export and the 
improvement in the terms of trade turned the trade balance 
into surplus during the period of II DNP, the invisible trade 
deficit, and consequently foreign indebtedness rose 
continuously after 1974. The second oil shock increased again 
the trade balance deficit and Brazil's indebtedness. To get 
rid of the new crisis, a set of orthodox policies such as 
liberation, deregulation, and privatization were used to
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realize the structure reform in the second step of 
adjustment. All these policies were directly linked to the 
promotion of large inflows of foreign capital. Under this 
strategy Brazil's foreign indebtedness continued to rise and 
peaked at $11493 million in 1988 (See Table 5.6), becoming 
the major obstacle to Brazil's economic development.
Theoretically speaking, developing countries are prone to 
foreign exchange constraints in their development process due 
to the shortage of domestic financial resources. 
International financial inflows can thus finance their 
capital demand beyond domestic resources, if this capital is 
used for developmental process, gross fixed capital formation 
can be accelerated. Paul Prebisch argued for the useful role 
of foreign capital inflows. He pointed out that acceleration 
of the rate of growth of developing countries in the process 
of industrialization increased the demand for imports of 
manufactured and other goods, creating a serious bottleneck 
that if not overcome may inhibit development. Under the 
conjunction of foreign capital inflow and need for 
development, such flows would pay a useful role in increasing 
exports and/or the substitution of imports.(Griffith 1984:47- 
49). However, external capital is a two-fold knife, in spite 
of its necessity for accelerating growth and 
industrialization, it possibly becomes an efficient mechanism 
for foreign debtors to control the development of borrowing 
countries, when the volume and conditions of such foreign
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capital inflows are not appropriated to the countries 
development needs of these countries.
An inappropriate performance in foreign debts can be caused 
by unfavourable external economic conditions and an improper 
macroeconomic strategy or both.
Reviewing Brazilian borrowing experiences from 1950s, the 
debt crisis after two oil shocks was mainly caused by 
unfavourable external economic conditions and worsened by the 
IMF-led SAP. In the 1950 and the 1960s, the inflow of foreign 
capital was encouraged as a supplementary policy to the ISI. 
The main foreign financial resources were private and 
official investors who pursued greater profits (Grifith 
1984:18). In this period, the amount and direction of foreign 
capital inflow were controlled by the government so as to 
assist the industrialization process.
During the 1970s, The most important debtors were 
multinational banks which eagerly expanded their lending to 
developing countries in search of greater profit (Grifith 
1984:18). Because of the rich and diversified resources of 
foreign capital at that time, Brazil possessed a relative 
stronger negotiation power in borrowing abroad. It enjoyed a 
great degree of autonomy in choosing better lending 
conditions which were more suitable for its development 
needs. Thus, the foreign debtors were under the pressure of
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competition, partly responding to the needs of Brazil's 
development and played a positive role in accelerating Brazil 
industrialization and easing the balance of payments, 
although they basically provided capital on behalf of their 
own interests. As the rapid increase of GDP attracted plenty 
of foreign capital resources, Brazil did not meet difficulty 
in obtaining enough foreign capital, in spite of the large 
deficit in the BOP.
Structuralists termed this kind of deficit as a "development 
deficit", which is a necessary and temporary cost of 
industrialization in the developing countries, and will be 
eliminated by the increase of the domestic GDP (Pastor, 
1987:21-24). As an inherent vulnerability of debt financed 
development, this deficit was subject to a deterioration in 
the external environment. Any of exogenous changes can easily 
and rapidly increase any existing payments deficits (Dell 
1982, Dell and Lawrence 1980).
This was the case for Brazil. When external conditions 
suddenly deteriorated because of the unprecedented oil 
shocks, Brazil jumped into a serious debt crisis. This change 
was due to factors entirely beyond Brazil's control.
Under this condition, Brazil resorted to increased external 
indebtedness to avoid recession at all costs. This 
accelerated the increase of foreign debts to an unmanageable
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level. After 1977-7 8, the Government launched a "loan hunt" 
to roll over its debts. In the extremely vulnerable position, 
the nature of borrowing was completely reversed from that of 
the 1950s and the 1960s. Between 1976-1989, in order or get 
more foreign inflow, a lot of state enterprises signed 
contracts with foreign debtors to link currency loan to the 
purchase of capital goods (faucher, 1981:22-25); Since then 
"it is no longer investment projects of public firms that 
attract foreign loans but the necessity to roll over the debt 
that creates projects"(Beluzzo in Rocha, 1992:81).
After the second oil shock in 1980, with a further 
deterioration of external conditions and more and more debts, 
Brazil was unable to not only finance its current account 
deficits but also to roll over its previously accumulated 
debts. Given the permanence of the current account deficit 
and the exhaustion of Brazil’s international private 
financial resources, Brazil was unable to honour its debt 
service commitments. The country was forced to submit an
adjustment program to the International Monetary Fund which 
had monopoly lending power at that time.
However, the SAP rejected the positive role of the deficit
and ignored the fact that a deteriorated external condition 
was the main reason of Brazil' debt crisis. Instead, it
insisted that deficits caused by an over-ambitious expansion 
industrialization strategy program and would impede growth
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and the payment problem. It introduced the recession policy 
to cure Brazil's crisis (Pastor, 1987)
Brazil's experience proved that a growth strategy based 
primarily on external capital bears a heavy economic cost for 
a developing country, and damaged the long-run development 
of Brazil's development. "To try to 'correct' the development 
deficit is to halt the development effort itself" (Abdalla 
1980:39).
With a heavy dependence on the inflow of foreign capital in 
this growth model, large profits of brazil were transferred 
to foreign investors and debtors. Between 1982 and 1991 
foreign firms transferred $11.3 Billion abroad in profits and 
dividends (Korton 1992:28). Between 1985 and 1989, Brazil 
transferred to foreign creditors $54.48 billion, an amount 
equivalent to half of the country's total foreign debt in 
1992. (Cadernos 1992:3) In this way, the industrialized 
countries did not provide aid for Brazil to overcome its 
crisis; rather Brazil provided profit for the growth of 
industrialized countries.
The damage of debt was not only reflected in the outflow of 
profits through interest repayment to the countries at the 
centre, but also reflected in the location of decision making 
structures was outside Brazil.
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As mentioned in the previous section, this strategy produced 
a sharp fall in investment, which fundamentally damaged 
Brazil's ability to generate in the long run more foreign 
exchange for its repayment of accumulated debts, trapping 
Brazil in a permanent reliance on foreign capital.
With the huge outflow of profit and due to the lack of 
internal accumulation, Brazil has had to resort to foreign 
capital to sustain its development. In the process it has 
been subjected to the policies of foreign capital, which has 
trapped it into borrowing more, further damaging its ability 
to repay the debts. This vicious circle has put Brazil into 
an extremely weak position in negotiations with foreign 
capital while borrowing from the IMF. It can do little in its 
own interest except for obeying IMF policies, in this sense, 
Brazil has become completely a 'periphery' of various of 
global capital accumulation. Foreign capital inflows no 
longer serve the development of Brazil, but the interest of 
foreign debtors. It is clear that SAP is leading Brazil's 
economy towards complete reliance on foreign capital. As a 
result, the rate of capital accumulation in Brazil has not 
been conditioned by its own interests, but by the interests 
of metropolitan capital.
Brazil's experience under an externally conditioned growth 
model shows how international capital severely undermined the 
state control over the national economic system and over
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policy decision crucial for local development. And it shows 
that the advancement of the interests of foreign capital has 
remained a central goal of national economic policy-making.
CONCLUSION
Facing the serious debt crises and high inflation caused by 
the dramatic deterioration of external conditions in Brazil, 
The IMF ignored this specific reason for crisis and the needs 
of Brazil, and forced Brazil with its lending power to adopt 
SAP . The whole package of neo-classical policies in the SAP 
have led brazil's economy into a particular dependent 
position in which its economy has been conditioned by 
external metropolitan interests within an international 
relationship of interdependence and integration. It remains 
extremely vulnerable to external conditions; its national and 
local development significantly controlled by the centre. 





Since 1950, Brazil has experienced a tortuous 
industrialization process. In nature, It has been a process 
of dependent development. "Development" because it is 
characterized by capital accumulation and an increasingly 
complex differentiation of its internal productive structure, 
"dependent" because it is indelibly marked by the effects of 
continued dependence on capital located in the current core 
countries(Evans, 1979).
Historically speaking, Brazil was a typical colonial country 
characterized by backward agricultural economy and close 
relation with the international economy. As a result, the 
economic development of Brazil has been influenced in a 
major way by its lack of capital and dependence on external 
conditions. How to get enough capital to finance its 
industrialization has been a key problem in Brazil's 
development process.
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In order to break out the classical dependent ties to the 
Centre and to get rid of the backward colonial agriculture- 
dominated economy, Brazil initiated its industrialization
under an ISI strategy aimed at establishing a self-sustaining 
industrial system on the basis of "state control" over
imports and the non-economic redistribution of domestic 
resources. Through this strategy Brazil successfully
established its diversified industries and became a Newly 
Industrialized Country. However, under the constraints of 
capital accumulation rooted in its colonial economy, before 
development became a cumulative circular process creating its 
own expansionary momentum, ISI exhausted its potential.
To seek enough capital for its continuing industrialization, 
Brazil turned to a combination strategy in its stabilization 
program which introduced neo-classical idea and policies of 
the free market and free trade. Under a favourable
international environment, this strategy worked very well in 
terms of economic growth, bringing about Brazil's famous 
"economic miracle". However, as this strategy opened Brazil's 
economy to the international market, Brazil's industries were 
gradually internationalized, and more and more dependent on 
foreign capital as the main financial resources for its 
industrialization process. As more and more foreign capital 
penetrated Brazil's economy, it gradually entered a new
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international division of labour and moved away its from an 
inward-oriented strategy of self-reliant development implied 
in ISI. Since then it has been subject to what can be viewed 
as a dependent development process. Brazil's economy, 
although growing at a high speed, was vulnerable to the 
external environment and became highly reliant on external 
capital.
Two oil shocks resulted in a dramatic deterioration of its 
external environment, which fully exposed the vulnerability 
of Brazil's dependent development. As the private external 
financial resources gradually dried out, Brazil suffered a 
debt crisis of major proportions. In order to roll over its 
heavy debts and sustain its economic growth, Brazil was 
forced to completely accept SAP designed by the IMF. Through 
conditional lending, the IMF gradually came to control the 
process of Brazil's development and shape its development 
according to the needs of the core countries.
The growth strategy of SAP, based primarily on external 
capital, has meant a heavy cost for Brazil in its 
development. In addition to a large outflow of capital to the 
centre in the form of debt repayment and profit remittances, 
Brazil totally lost its autonomy at the level of policy 
decision making because of the shift of the public sector's 
leading role towards a private sector aligned with 
international capital, and also because the recession policy.
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fundamentally damaged its capacity for domestic capital 
accumulation in the process of further development, in this 
way, SAP has led Brazil into a particular dependent position 
on external capital with all of its consequences, many of 
them negative.
Brazil's industrialization experience proves that SAP is not 
an appropriate or desirable strategy for its development. The 
basic reason for this is rooted in its consequent one-way 
policy. In a world separated into different groups with 
conflicting interests, there is no universal development 
model. Although both developed countries and developing 
countries are facing an economic crisis, the causes are 
totally different. In developed countries, the crises 
resulted from their internal structural weakness which might 
be cured by effective financial management and stabilization 
policies. But for developing countries, their difficulties 
derived from their remaining colonial economic structure and 
unfavourable external conditions. It is the case of Brazil. 
Brazil has confronted the need and sought to break out of its 
old structure and establish a self sustaining economy. Facing 
economic powers reluctant to give up their control over the 
world economy brazil has had to protect itself through state 
intervention. However, SAPs ignore the needs of developing 
countries, and are aimed at distorting the leading role of 
the state in the development process , and so create a 
dependent peripheral economy that confronts to the general
98
interests of the developed world, integrating Brazil into the 
new international division of labour in which core countries 
enjoy considerable advantages. SAPs by their nature, 
generally are designed to the benefit of core countries.
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